Times Mag Reveals Gitmo Torture

[LowerCaseRepublican]

Nuke, see lawyers and law experts. See experts write. See experts own your incorrect position.

 

In Odah v. U.S. the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit faced the question of whether citizens of Australia, Kuwait, and Britain captured in Afghanistan and detained at the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba have a legal right to challenge their detention.

 

The fact that the detainees are non-citizens was not crucial to the decision: non-citizens in the U.S. enjoy many of the same constitutional rights that citizens do. Accordingly, the court in Odah acknowledged that the relief sought - a writ of habeas corpus - was indeed available to non-citizens. The courts have also ruled that suspects must receive Miranda warnings.

 

People who will face our criminal law, as courts have stated, should receive the protections of our Constitution, especially when Guantanamo is US soil for all extensive purposes (Cuba can only opt out of the treaty which created Gitmo if the US agrees)

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

No actually the reason that the SC has not shut down GITMO is far more complex than your misunderstanding of the constitution.

 

I will gladly discuss how the United States government has created a loop hole that makes these detainees exist outside of both the Geneva Convention and US jurisdiction.

 

But, I am pretty certain it is not because noncitizens do not have constitutional rights.

 

SB

 

The controlling precedent concerning the Fourth Amendment's application to aliens outside the United States is United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. [40] Verdugo-Urquidez was indicted on drug charges under United States law, when he was a Mexican citizen residing in Mexico. Mexican police officers delivered Verdugo-Urquidez to the United States border, where he was arrested and charged. Agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), with the permission and assistance of the Mexican federal police, conducted searches of Verdugo-Urquidez's two houses in Mexico, obtaining documents evidencing Verdugo-Urquidez's drug smuggling.

 

 

On Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress the documents, the District Court ruled the Fourth Amendment applied to the searches conducted in Mexico, and that the DEA agents had no cause to conduct those searches without a warrant. [41] The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the searches were subject to the Fourth Amendment, and therefore unlawful without a warrant or exigent circumstances. [42]

 

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure of a nonresident alien's property outside of the United States. [43] Both the majority opinion and the dissent recognized that the Fourth Amendment applied to protect American citizens, without regard to territorial restriction. [44] While other provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, establish procedural trial rights which inure to a person who becomes a criminal defendant in United States custody, the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on search and seizure protect a right of "the people" as opposed to any person or any accused. A search and seizure can violate these restrictions prior to, or even absent, a trial or conviction. [45] It therefore made no difference to a Fourth Amendment analysis, despite the dissent's protest to the contrary, whether Verdugo-Urquidez was within or without the United States, or in custody, at the time the agents searched the Mexican properties. A judicial warrant would have had null effect outside the United States. [46] But a requirement to obtain a warrant, implied by application of the Fourth Amendment, would have pernicious effect on United States operations overseas, including, the Court feared, military operations. [47] The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the two lower courts' opinions.

 

The Supreme Court dissent noted that "non-law enforcement activities, not directed against enemy aliens in wartime but nevertheless implicating national security" [48] should not suffer impairment under the Fourth Amendment. "Many situations involving sensitive operations abroad likely would involve exigent circumstances" and thus not need a warrant. [49] Thus both the dissent and the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez leave open the possibility that intelligence collection and operations overseas can proceed without constitutional burden, on the significant, if unstated, assumption that the intent remains unchanged throughout the investigation to collect information solely for intelligence purposes. But the dissent's analysis seems necessarily to rely on the continued dichotomy between intelligence and law enforcement in distinguishing the Fourth Amendment's applicability to either function. In today's world, where the line between crime and war has been blurred by mass murder of civilians in attacks upon nations by unlawful belligerents, the dichotomy between gathering "intelligence" in support of national defense and obtaining evidence in support of law enforcement is less clear than the dissent might have supposed.

 

Similar considerations govern seizures, as well as searches, of aliens abroad. Since the Nineteenth Century it has been held that United States courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over any one properly charged and present before that court, regardless of how he found his way to that court. "[D]ue process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized [sic] of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards." [50] The defendant can legally be tried even after plain abduction brought him to the court, whether across interstate lines, [51] or across international borders. [52] The Supreme Court most recently affirmed this principle in United States v. Alvarez-Machain. [53] While the international application of this principle is subject to the strictures of any given extradition treaty between the United States and the alien's nation of citizenship, under customary international law practice, any individual rights under an extradition treaty are solely derivative of the nation's rights. Any government must specifically object in accordance with the terms of the extradition treaty, for only governments can invoke such treaties, and the rights under them can be and frequently are waived. [54]

 

This does not mean that aliens would be devoid of all legal protection or safeguard. The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez left the door open to constitutional claims by aliens in this country. [55] In addition, where the Constitution and federal statutes are otherwise silent, aliens may resort to relevant international agreements such extradition treaties, treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, tax treaties, and mutual legal assistance treaties, to the extent they are self-executing.

 

[56] The farther an individual is removed from the "community," the less claim he has to constitutional protection. [57] Accordingly, it would be reasonable to conclude that an unlawful belligerent--even within the United States (and certainly outside the United States)--has by taking up arms against the United States so far removed himself from the national community as to forfeit Fourth Amendment rights.In conclusion, under Verdugo-Urquidez, the Fourth Amendment does not operate to protect individuals; rather it operates to protect "the class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with the country to be considered part of that community."

 

The precedent set by this case confirms at least part of my argument.

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

Nuke, see lawyers and law experts.  See experts write.  See experts own your incorrect position.

 

In Odah v. U.S. the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit faced the question of whether citizens of Australia, Kuwait, and Britain captured in Afghanistan and detained at the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba have a legal right to challenge their detention.

 

The fact that the detainees are non-citizens was not crucial to the decision: non-citizens in the U.S. enjoy many of the same constitutional rights that citizens do. Accordingly, the court in Odah acknowledged that the relief sought - a writ of habeas corpus - was indeed available to non-citizens.  The courts have also ruled that suspects must receive Miranda warnings.

 

People who will face our criminal law, as courts have stated, should receive the protections of our Constitution, especially when Guantanamo is US soil for all extensive purposes (Cuba can only opt out of the treaty which created Gitmo if the US agrees)

 

See experts not look up the controlling precedent concerning the 4th amendment rights of non-citizens.

 

See Apu put his foot in his mouth yet again.

[Soxbadger]

Did you even read it?

 

The first damn sentence:

 

The controlling precedent concerning the Fourth Amendment's application to aliens outside the United States is United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.

 

ALIENS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

 

In fact it was property outside of the state.

 

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure of a nonresident alien's property outside of the United States.

 

Once again, non-citizen inside of the United States.

 

(Edited because you missed the precedent your own case presented.)

 

This does not mean that aliens would be devoid of all legal protection or safeguard. The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez left the door open to constitutional claims by aliens in this country. [55] In addition, where the Constitution and federal statutes are otherwise silent, aliens may resort to relevant international agreements such extradition treaties, treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, tax treaties, and mutual legal assistance treaties, to the extent they are self-executing.

 

SB

Edited June 14, 2005 by Soxbadger

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

Did you even read it?

 

The first damn sentence:

ALIENS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

 

In fact it was property outside of the state.

Once again, non-citizen inside of the United States.

 

(Edited because you missed the precedent your own case presented.)

SB

 

 

Now I will isolate the sailent point of this again because even though I put it in bold you overlooked it.

 

In conclusion, under Verdugo-Urquidez, the Fourth Amendment does not operate to protect individuals; rather it operates to protect "the class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with the country to be considered part of that community." [56] The farther an individual is removed from the "community," the less claim he has to constitutional protection. [57] Accordingly, it would be reasonable to conclude that an unlawful belligerent--even within the United States (and certainly outside the United States)--has by taking up arms against the United States so far removed himself from the national community as to forfeit Fourth Amendment rights.

 

Once again. What connection do these people have "to that community" aside from the fact that they were picked up shooting at our soldiers?

Edited June 14, 2005 by NUKE_CLEVELAND

[Soxbadger]

That is not the actual text of the case. That is some conclusion of some message board you stole it from.

 

http://www.guncite.com/court/fed/sc/494us259.html

 

Unless you want to tell me which Justice's opinion it is from, because Im not searching through 30+ pages.

 

I control Fed a segment of your quote to make sure it did not come up, and I was right.

 

SB

Edited June 14, 2005 by Soxbadger

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

And furthermore............

 

 

The authority that the Constitution confers on the federal government to prosecute the enemy by all appropriate means applies to the enemy found at home as well as those encountered abroad. Quirin concerned a group of saboteurs who were landed by German U-boats on U.S. beaches during World War II. Their assignment from the German military authorities was to destroy military targets and war-production facilities on the U.S. home front. All of the saboteurs were Germans except one, Haupt, who claimed to be a naturalized U.S. citizen. After capture by the FBI, the belligerents were placed in military custody. Pursuant to an Executive order, they were tried by a military commission, which found them all guilty and sentenced them to death. They then filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus, challenging the authority of the military tribunal, and the tribunal's denial to them during its proceedings of the Constitutional rights specified in Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

 

The Supreme Court upheld the military commission's authority. The Court concluded that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the power to enforce all laws relating to the conduct of war, "and to carry into effect . . . all laws defining and punishing offenses against the law of nations including those which pertain to the conduct of war." [5] This power, the Court held, includes the authority "to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war." [6]

 

The Court likewise rejected the would-be saboteurs' claim to the traditional constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused in the criminal justice system. The Court concluded, first, that the saboteurs were not criminal defendants, but rather were unlawful belligerents accused of violating the laws of war. "[A]n enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, is familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed . . . to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals." [7]

 

And there you have it. Enemy belligerents HAVE NO RIGHTS. The Supreme Court set this precedence forth by denying Nazi Sabatouers constitutional rights for their actions.

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

That is not the actual text of the case. That is some conclusion of some message board you stole it from.

 

http://www.guncite.com/court/fed/sc/494us259.html

 

SB

 

 

Wrong. That was taken from the Federalist Society.

 

http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terror...rytribunals.htm

[Soxbadger]

Sigh

 

Nuke,

 

Enemy combatants such as Nazi's would now fall under the Geneva Convention.

 

The reason the Geneva Convention was not holding during WWII was because it did not exist until after WWII.

 

I will explain this simply.

 

Enemy troops = Geneva convention.

 

Criminals= US Constitution

 

Illegal combatants= Outside of both.

 

Atleast now when you argue with your friends you can use a correct term and maybe actually win the argument based on the fact that the illegal combatant argument is currently valid.

 

SB

[Soxbadger]

That is not precedent!

 

That is a website, I could write an equally articulated website that made lots of theories based on dicta and taking judges words out of context. But that is not what that case really means.

 

The case they use to argue noncitizens have no rights is a case concerning alieans rights outside of the US. It would be very strange to believe that an Alien had US rights in Mexico.

 

Honestly can you really not see that you are wrong?

 

Read the case, I gave you the actual words of the judges. Not some website with an agenda.

 

Read for yourself.

 

And read your website's purpose statement:

 

http://www.fed-soc.org/ourpurpose.htm

 

Notice no part says, we are giving you precedent.

 

SB

Edited June 14, 2005 by Soxbadger

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

Sigh

 

Nuke,

 

Enemy combatants such as Nazi's would now fall under the Geneva Convention.

 

The reason the Geneva Convention was not holding during WWII was because it did not exist until after WWII.

 

I will explain this simply.

 

Enemy troops = Geneva convention.

 

Criminals= US Constitution

 

Illegal combatants= Outside of both.

 

Atleast now when you argue with your friends you can use a correct term and maybe actually win the argument based on the fact that the illegal combatant argument is currently valid.

 

SB

 

 

What are terrorists?

 

Are they enemy troops? No. They are not part of any Army

 

Are they criminals? Would you call a free lance terrorist captured on foregin soil a criminal in the traditional sense. I wouldn't.

 

Are they illegal combatants? Thats the most plausible way to define random violence directed against our soldiers such as act perpetrated by foregin terrorists.

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

That is not precedent!

 

That is a website, I could write an equally articulated website that made lots of theories based on dicta and taking judges words out of context. But that is not what that case really means.

 

The case they use to argue noncitizens have no rights is a case concerning alieans rights outside of the US. It would be very strange to believe that an Alien had US rights in Mexico.

 

Honestly can you really not see that you are wrong?

 

Read the case, I gave you the actual words of the judges. Not some website with an agenda.

 

Read for yourself.

 

And read your website's purpose statement:

 

http://www.fed-soc.org/ourpurpose.htm

 

Notice no part says, we are giving you precedent.

 

SB

 

 

THEY QUOTED DIRECTLY FROM THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS!!!

 

Jesus you have a thick skull.

 

Quoted. You know, as in wrote down the words exactly as the Court did all those years ago.

Edited June 14, 2005 by NUKE_CLEVELAND

[Soxbadger]

Nuke,

 

Go read the Geneva Convention for yourself.

 

Search google for these terms:

 

Geneva convention, Illegal combatant. Geneva convention, POW.

 

Then you can read the Wikepdia article that comes up and argue the, Why they should be illegal combatant arguments, and I will take the, why the US should term them as criminals as opposed to illegal combatants.

 

Take as long as you want, but I think we can finally get past this, the constitution does not apply to non-citizens.

 

SB

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

QUOTH THE SUPREME COURT

 

 

"[A]n enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, is familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed . . . to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals." [7]

[Soxbadger]

Nuke,

 

Find it.

 

I gave you the damn case, find it for me in the case. Not from the website, do the research.

 

You want me to read through the entire case just to prove that its not there, why do you not find it and then I will read it and show you why the misinterpreted it.

 

I can quote minority opinions as well, but they are minority opinions. Or I can quote dicta, which has does not bind lower courts, and use it for my argument.

 

I read Rhenquist's opinion, it stated that the 4th amendment does not apply to nolncitizens outside of the US. There is no reason why they would rule on noncitizens inside the US because that is not the case at hand.

 

They can not just start making up rules, they can only rule on questions that are being presented to them.

 

Im sorry, but you are going to have to do a little work to support your unfounded conclusion.

 

SB

[Soxbadger]

Give me the cites.

 

They will be NUMBER US NUMBER.

 

If you can not even give me the decency of citing the case, why should I even be here?

 

SB

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

Give me the cites.

 

They will be NUMBER US NUMBER.

 

If you can not even give me the decency of citing the case, why should I even be here?

 

SB

 

 

http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/f...law/quirin.html

 

 

Enjoy.

 

The most salient points.

 

Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. It is as an enemy belligerent that petitioner Haupt is charged with entering the United States, and unlawful belligerency is the gravamen of the offense of which he is accused.

 

Nor are petitioners any the less belligerents if, as they argue, they have not actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or entered the theatre or zone of active military operations. The argument leaves out of account the nature of the offense which the Government charges and which the Act of Congress, by incorporating the law of war, punishes. It is that each petitioner, in circumstances which gave him the status of an enemy belligerent, passed our military and naval lines and defenses or went behind those lines, in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. The offense was complete when with that purpose they entered-or, having so entered, they remained upon-our territory in time of war without uniform or other appropriate means of identification. For that reason, even when committed by a citizen, the offense is distinct from the crime of treason defined in Article III, 3 of the Constitution, since the absence of uniform essential to one is irrelevant to the other.

 

But petitioners insist that even if the offenses with which they are charged are offenses against the law of war, their trial is subject to the requirement of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, and that such trials must be by jury in a civil court...In the light of this long-continued and consistent interpretation we must conclude that Section 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission, or to have required that offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be tried only in the civil courts....We conclude that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military commission, and that petitioners, charged with such an offense not required to be tried by jury at common law, were lawfully placed on trial by the Commission without a jury.

Edited June 14, 2005 by NUKE_CLEVELAND

[Soxbadger]

Thank you,

 

That case does not state what your saying it does;

 

The Court holds:

(1) That the charges preferred against petitioners on which they are being tried by military commission appointed by the order of the President of July 2, 1942, allege an offense or offenses which the President is authorized to order tried before a military commission.

(2) That the military commission was lawfully constituted.

(3) That petitioners are held in lawful custody, for trial before the military commission, and have not shown cause for being discharged by writ of habeas corpus.

The motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.

The orders of the District Court are affirmed. The mandates are directed to issue forthwith.

 

Now lets look at the more significant part of the holding.

 

What was the year, 1942.

 

When did I tell you the Geneva Convention happened?

 

After WWII, 1942 is before the end of the conflict. Therefore this case is not of any significant precedent because it occurred before the Geneva Convention. In which these soldiers would have been protected as POW.

 

But since the GC did not exist, the US set out rules that are very close to due process. Lawfully constituted, held for trial.

 

The difference in Gitmo?

 

There are no charges or trials...

 

Once again not distinguishable and not even holding because prior to Geneva Convention, which the US is a party to.

 

SB

[Soxbadger]

And your argument is in direct opposition to your statement that they are illegal enemy combatants.

 

The people here are tried in the law of war. The United States is explicitly taking the position that the prisoners of GITMO are not soldiers, or part of a war. Because if they were to be tried by the law of war, they would fall under the Geneva Convention.

 

Therefore if you want Quirin to be precedent, you have to argue that they would now fall under Geneva Convention protections.

 

 

SB

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

Thank you,

 

That case does not state what your saying it does;

Now lets look at the more significant part of the holding.

 

What was the year, 1942.

 

When did I tell you the Geneva Convention happened?

 

After WWII, 1942 is before the end of the conflict. Therefore this case is not of any significant precedent because it occurred before the Geneva Convention. In which these soldiers would have been protected as POW.

 

But since the GC did not exist, the US set out rules that are very close to due process. Lawfully constituted, held for trial.

 

The difference in Gitmo?

 

There are no charges or trials...

 

Once again not distinguishable and not even holding because prior to Geneva Convention, which the US is a party to.

 

SB

 

Article 4

 

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

 

1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

 

2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:

 

(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

 

(B) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

 

© That of carrying arms openly;

 

(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

 

3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

 

4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.

 

5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

 

6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

 

B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:

 

1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.

 

2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.

 

C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.

 

 

Can we agree that terrorist activity violates the laws of war?

 

That being the case the detainees being the free-lance terrorists that they are, are not entitled to the protections of the convention.

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

And your argument is in direct opposition to your statement that they are illegal enemy combatants.

 

The people here are tried in the law of war. The United States is explicitly taking the position that the prisoners of GITMO are not soldiers, or part of a war. Because if they were to be tried by the law of war, they would fall under the Geneva Convention.

 

Therefore if you want Quirin to be precedent, you have to argue that they would now fall under Geneva Convention protections.

SB

 

 

Were the Nazi sabetours uniformed members of th armed forces? No. They were dressed in civillian attire, much like our friends detained in Cuba now. It's perfectly consistent.

 

Remember this in reference to our Nazi friends?

 

It is that each petitioner, in circumstances which gave him the status of an enemy belligerent, passed our military and naval lines and defenses or went behind those lines, in civilian dress and with hostile purpose. The offense was complete when with that purpose they entered-or, having so entered, they remained upon-our territory in time of war without uniform or other appropriate means of identification.

 

The Supreme Court defined the Nazi Saboteurs as "enemy belligerents", not as soldiers.

Edited June 14, 2005 by NUKE_CLEVELAND

[Rex Kickass]

Although this debate on the constitutionality of the GITMO camp is very interesting, I'd love to see someone answer this question: its more philosophy than anything else.

 

If you are fighting someone to preserve your way of life and liberty and standards, why would you change your way of life and liberty and standards to preserve them?

[NUKE_CLEVELAND]

Although this debate on the constitutionality of the GITMO camp is very interesting, I'd love to see someone answer this question: its more philosophy than anything else.

 

If you are fighting someone to preserve your way of life and liberty and standards, why would you change your way of life and liberty and standards to preserve them?

 

 

The GITMO camp and the goings on down there pale in comparison to previous acts taken on behalf of national security.

 

-The suspension of Habeus Corpus, free speech and other rights by Lincoln during the Civil War

 

-The wholesale internment of persons of Japanese descent during WWII without any due process or even lifting a finger to see if there was any reason to believe they were a threat

 

There is actually a legal basis for what is happening down there and the Bush Administration, as I have demonstrated, has 2 solid legs to stand on. I say it is the left which is actually denying these people a fair hearing by holding up the process of military tribunals with legal challenges.

 

Additionally those who have been found to be of no further intelligence value have been released to their home countries so the "indefinite detention" argument is also a false one.

 

 

BTW I am making far too many spelling errors to correct. I'm not used to the keyboard on my new laptop yet.

Edited June 14, 2005 by NUKE_CLEVELAND

[Soxbadger]

Nuke,

 

The remaining four petitioners at the same French port boarded another German submarine, which carried them across the Atlantic to Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. On or about June 17, 1942, they came ashore during the hours of darkness wearing caps of the German Marine Infantry and carrying with them a supply of explosives, fuses, and incendiary and timing devices. They immediately buried their caps and the other articles mentioned and proceeded in civilian dress to Jacksonville, Florida, and thence to various points in the United States. All were taken into custody in New York or Chicago by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All had received instructions in Germany from an officer of the German High Command to destroy war industries and war facilities in the United States, for which they or their relatives in Germany were to receive salary payments from the German Government. They also had been paid by the German Government during their course of training at the sabotage school and had received substantial sums in United States currency, which were in their possession when arrested. The currency had been handed to them by an officer of the German High Command, who had instructed them to wear their German uniforms while landing in the United States.

 

Also there is an exception under the Geneva convention for not having to always be uniformed. If you look under the specific articles of the Geneva convention it should be there.

 

And this is the real argument, how they should be classified.

 

The internment of Japanese American's really has nothing to do with this. And it has been ruled unconstutional as well.

 

Winodj,

 

Because the people who believe in GITMO do not believe that they are changing their standards. They believe that this is the way it should be, just as many believed that slavery was correct, or seperate but equal. In each case people had opinions that reflected their standards.

 

I will not be so quick to try and judge some one for their standpoint, as perhaps my position will eventually become the one that was historically incorrect. I can only try and defend the position I believe true, to the best of my abilities, and hope that what I believe is right.

 

SB

[Rex Kickass]

The GITMO camp and the goings on down there pale in comparison to previous acts taken on behalf of national security.

 

-The suspension of Habeus Corpus, free speech and other rights by Lincoln during the Civil War

 

-The wholesale internment of persons of Japanese descent during WWII without any due process or even lifting a finger to see if there was any reason to believe they were a threat

 

There is actually a legal basis for what is happening down there and the Bush Administration, as I have demonstrated, has 2 solid legs to stand on.  I say it is the left which is actually denying these people a fair hearing by holding up the process of military tribunals with legal challenges. 

 

Additionally those who have been found to be of no further intelligence value have been released to their home countries so the "indefinite detention" argument is also a false one.

BTW  I am making far too many spelling errors to correct.  I'm not used to the keyboard on my new laptop yet.

 

So your justification is that "it's less wrong than when we put all the Japanese in Concentration Camps (which is, by definition, what the internment camps are). We believe that all men are created equal. If so, why is our treatment of enemy combatants held to a lower standard than how we would treat our own criminals?