Bush plan for victory

[southsider2k5]

This speech lays out exactly what the goals are and what determines victory in Iraq.

 

http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/07/bus...ript/index.html

[Steve Bartman's my idol]

Hopefully his plan for getting out of Iraq will be as effective ashis (personal) plan for getting out of Viet Nam was!

[FlaSoxxJim]

I didn't hear the speach and have yet to read the transcript. Did Peter Feaver whip this up too?

[Balta1701]

Actually, it doesn't, and furthermore, it totally ignores the actual facts on the ground.

 

What it does do is lay out what I would call "Goals". In other words, it gives general ideas focused on staying the course, but gives absolutely no criteria whatsoever for determining when those goals are met. Here is a prime example:

 

And as we fight the terrorists, we're working to build capable and effective Iraqi security forces so they can take the lead in the fight and eventually take responsibility for the safety and security of their citizens without major foreign assistance.

 

As Iraqi forces become more capable, they're taking responsibility for more and more Iraqi territory. We're transferring bases for their control to take the fight to the enemy. And that means American and coalition forces can concentrate on training Iraqis and hunting down high-value targets like Zarqawi.

 

On the economic side, we're helping Iraqis rebuild their infrastructure and reform their economy, build the prosperity that will give all Iraqis a stake in a free and peaceful Iraq.

You see what he did there? I think it's fairly obvious...he talked about how we're "Building an effective Iraqi security force" without ever defining how we should judge the effectiveness of that Iraqi security force. This is almost exactly the "In the fight" dodge that was all over the "Victory strategery" document that they released last week, where they came up with a new term regarding the training of Iraqis - "In the fight", without ever telling us what In the fight actually meant in terms of training, equipment, capabilities, or even loyalty to the national government.

 

He says that Iraqi forces will be allowed to "take the lead". Ok, fine, when will that be possible? How many Iraqi troops will need to reach this level of training before we can begin to fallback? And most importantly, how does he react to the DOD's statement before Congress that the # of Iraqi battalions capable of independent operation has declined from 3 to 1 in the last year? Based on that metric, the number of Iraqi troops able to "take the lead" would have declined, not increased.

 

Furthermore, Bush at one point holds up the example of Najaf, a place where the U.S. troops actually have pulled back, giving control to "Iraqi Forces". The problem is...the only Iraqi forces on the ground who have managed to control anything have not really been forces loyal to the national government, they've been forces under the control of the Shi'ite Militia groups, such as the Badr corps, who have been casually folded into the national army since the Shi'ites have taken control over the national government.

 

Here is Juan Cole on this particular topic a few days ago.

 

Ed Wong of the NYT gets the story again. He explores exactly what has happened in Najaf since September when US troops departed the city for a base 40 miles away. He argues that: The local security forces have the province relatively well in hand, and there is only one bombing or serious attack a month there. He says that the local security forces do not seem as massively penetrated by the militias of the religious parties. as is the case in Basra. The Iraqi police and military do have to call the US troops in to handle a particularly challenging situation about once a month.

 

The one issue about which I'd like more information is probably one on which it cannot be had. How many of the police and Iraqi military in Najaf have a background in the Badr Corps? The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq controls the provincial government and the deputy governor is Badr Organization. My suspicion is that the relative security in Najaf has to do precisely with the Badr Corps members stepping up, in the framework of the Iraqi security forces. Perhaps they do not advertise their former allegiance as much as in Basra. But it would be downright weird if Badr were not deeply involved in Najaf security. And the big difference with Basra is probably that SCIRI/Badr is in political control of Najaf, so that politics and security are in sync, whereas in Basra the governing council is diverse and SCIRI is not in control, while police with a Badr Corps background are a major group.

Now, if we're willing to basically hand over Iraq to the Shi'ite militias, we probably would see a civil war, but the Shi'ites would win based on numbers and Iranian support. That is basically who is controlling Najaf right now - the Shi'ites. And his speech even goes so far as to basically ignore what actually happened in Najaf...where the U.S. challenged Al Sadr's militia, and Al Sadr backed off on orders from Sistani...only to emerge a few months later with his militia in tact as a very strong political force.

 

This speech contains no more details than any other one. All it says is "things are working and we must stay the course". However, as usual, it only gives anecdotes to describe how things are working...it gives no general specifics through which we could evaluate the progress of the war. It gives no way by which we could determine how long we're going to be there. It gives no hint how long any of these processes will take. And it subtly glosses over the real risks we're taking to try to make the place look more appealing - risks like relying on Kurdish and Shi'ite militia groups to control territory.

[Balta1701]

By the way, here's Another worthy piece from Cole on exactly where these Shi'ite militias came from, how close they are with Iran, and why the U.S. is backed into the corner of gradually giving them control of Iraq.