North Korea disarmament agreement reached

[southsider2k5]

http://www.breitbart.com/news/2007/02/12/D8N8CB980.html

 

BEIJING (AP) -- Negotiators reached a tentative agreement on initial steps for North Korea's nuclear disarmament, the U.S. envoy to the talks said Tuesday.

Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said the agreement outlined specific commitments for North Korea and would set up working groups to implement those goals to begin meeting in about a month. He declined to give other details.

 

 

 

"I'm encouraged by this that we were able to take a step forward on the denuclearization issue," Hill said.

 

The agreement could mark the first step toward disarmament in more than three years of inconclusive negotiations and deadlock. The process reached its lowest point in October when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test explosion.

 

The draft agreement came after 16 hours of what Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang called "extraordinarily intensive consultations" on the fifth day of talks.

 

"Some positive results have been achieved," Qin said, but added that the negotiators would have to meet again later Tuesday in Beijing.

 

Japan's chief envoy said it was "too early to tell" if his government was satisfied with the deal.

 

"I believe that countries have compromised somewhat toward an agreement," Kenichiro Sasae said, declining to give any specifics.

 

The current round of six-nation talks began Thursday on a promising note after the United States and North Korea signaled a willingness to compromise. But negotiations quickly became mired on the issue of how much energy aid the North would get in exchange for initial steps of disarmament.

 

Other delegates at the talks _ which also include Russia and South Korea _ had called North Korea's earlier demands for energy excessive.

 

South Korean and Japanese media reports gave varying accounts of how much energy North Korea was demanding, including up to 2 million kilowatts of electricity or 2 million tons of heavy fuel oil.

 

Under a 1994 U.S.-North Korea disarmament agreement, the North was to receive 500,000 tons of fuel oil a year before construction was completed of two nuclear reactors that would be able to generate 2 million kilowatts of electricity.

 

That deal fell apart in late 2002 when the U.S. accused the North of conducting a secret uranium enrichment program, sparking the latest nuclear crisis.

 

The apparent progress came after the U.S. envoy said the meetings that began Monday would be the last day for this round of talks, saying the possibility for a breakthrough was solely in North Korea's hands.

 

____

 

Associated Press reporters Audra Ang, Alexa Olesen and Hiroko Tabuchi contributed to

[kapkomet]

I just need to be quiet in this thread.

[Gregory Pratt]

Poor journalism, IMO.

 

From the article:

The agreement could mark the first step toward disarmament in more than three years of inconclusive negotiations and deadlock. The process reached its lowest point in October when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test explosion.

 

From the NYTimes:

 

A summary of the proposed agreement that was circulated among senior policy makers in Washington before the Tuesday morning announcement made clear that even if the North agreed to take the listed first steps — sealing its main nuclear reactor and inviting international inspectors back into the country — there was no specific deadline for it to turn over any nuclear weapons or weapons fuel that it had produced in recent years. That would happen only after the parties reached another agreement.

 

In essence, the draft appeared intended to prevent the North from producing more weapons, but to defer discussions over the weapons and fuel it has already stockpiled. Mr. Hill had earlier suggested that if the current talks were to yield an agreement, follow-up discussions could be held in March and April. The summary calls for the six nations in the talks to “create working groups for full and rapid implementation” of a September 2005 agreement in which the North agreed in principle to abandon its nuclear weapons.

 

But in the past, the North Korean envoys to similar working groups have proven to have no real negotiating authority. The summary, which did not include language on what the North would get in return for shutting down its weapons program, was given to The New York Times by a person who was trying to explain the timing and vagueness of the deal’s elements.

 

This isn't disarmament at all nor is it really a first step toward it. It's some progress, with promises of less trouble in the future by shutting down their reactors and such, but it doesn't take away from their present weapons or supplies and so it's very misleading the way this is being talked about.

[Rex Kickass]

I think we're seeing the benefits of two things here. Actual diplomatic efforts from the US and a failed nuclear test from North Korea.

[southsideirish71]

Evil American pigs, I will get them all. I cant wait till I hear how the tests went.

 

 

So Cornell Yi, how many megaton was it. Well how many kilotons was it, you mean it was 7 tons. Oh s***, back to the negotiating table.

[NorthSideSox72]

Evil American pigs, I will get them all. I cant wait till I hear how the tests went.

 

 

So Cornell Yi, how many megaton was it. Well how many kilotons was it, you mean it was 7 tons. Oh s***, back to the negotiating table.

You forgot the part where Colonel Yi gets decapitated for his ineptitude.

[Texsox]

The check is in the mail, I've worn cowboy boots all my life . . .

[Balta1701]

BLITZER: But why do you say it contradicts his policy? He's been insisting he wanted to negotiate some sort of deal with North Korea through the so-called Six-Party Talks. Why does this contradict that approach?

 

Former U.N. Ambassador BOLTON: This is in many respects simply a repetition of the agreed framework of 1994. You know, Secretary Powell in 2001 started off the administration by saying he was prepared to pick up where the Clinton administration left off. President Bush changed course and followed a different approach. This is the same thing that the State Department was prepared to do six years ago. If we going to cut this deal now, it's amazing we didn't cut it back then. So I'm hoping that this is not really what's going to happen.

Transcript.

[southsider2k5]

Transcript.

 

The irony is that I don't think it will work any better than the 1994 agreement, and even if we had done the agreement 6 years ago, it wouldn't have worked then either. I imagine we will be at this point again in the future, because NKs economy is a shambles, and they will need to hold the world hostage for something again soon enough. Our best hope is for Il to somehow exit the picture, and the whole system just collapse. At least then someone could get some influence in the country while they are rebuilding it.

[Balta1701]

The irony is that I don't think it will work any better than the 1994 agreement, and even if we had done the agreement 6 years ago, it wouldn't have worked then either. I imagine we will be at this point again in the future, because NKs economy is a shambles, and they will need to hold the world hostage for something again soon enough. Our best hope is for Il to somehow exit the picture, and the whole system just collapse. At least then someone could get some influence in the country while they are rebuilding it.

If the whole system is going to collapse...i for one would have liked it to do so before they reprocessed all that plutonium, rather than after.

[southsider2k5]

If the whole system is going to collapse...i for one would have liked it to do so before they reprocessed all that plutonium, rather than after.

 

Their program has never been interputed, even when we had "agreements". The only difference is it has been more "public" at times vs other times when they hid it better to keep receiving their bribes. This agreement will be no different.

[Balta1701]

Their program has never been interputed, even when we had "agreements". The only difference is it has been more "public" at times vs other times when they hid it better to keep receiving their bribes. This agreement will be no different.

Totally untrue. The material which made up the attempted test was under U.N. Seal from the time of the agreed framework until 2002. They may have been doing other things that were in violation, but the program which produced their testable device was totally interrupted for a number of years. They could have reprocessed those fuel rods years beforehand, probably giving them multiple nuclear weapons by 1996-1997 barring U.S. invasion and did not do so. That was a major interruption in the program.

Edited February 13, 2007 by Balta1701

[southsider2k5]

Totally untrue. The material which made up the attempted test was under U.N. Seal from the time of the agreed framework until 2002. They may have been doing other things that were in violation, but the program which produced their testable device was totally interrupted for a number of years. They could have reprocessed those fuel rods years beforehand, probably giving them multiple nuclear weapons by 1996-1997 barring U.S. invasion and did not do so. That was a major interruption in the program.

 

You are completely wrong here.

 

They weren't processing it because they were buying it from AQ Kahn and Pakistan. They still had a nuclear program going on underground. There was no interuption of their program.

[Balta1701]

You are completely wrong here.

 

They weren't processing it because they were buying it from AQ Kahn and Pakistan. They still had a nuclear program going on underground. There was no interuption of their program.

No, I'm afraid you're the one who is simply completely wrong. The Pakistani nuclear program focused almost entirely on Uranium production, because in the 1970's foreign powers began restricting sales of equipment to Pakistan that could be used in plutonium production. Pakistan was virtually unable to produce enriched plutonium before the turn of the century. On the other hand, the devices that AQ Khan built for the Pakistanis, which were tested successfully in 1998, were Uranium 235 fission devices, not plutonium devices.

 

Khan developed the program and the technology that would export his uranium enrichment experience. North Korea was consequently only able to deal with the Khan network on Uranium enrichment, because that was all that Khan had to offer. Plutonium enrichment is a totally different story, and North Korea had been working on that path for decades prior to the framework of 1994. It is in part because of the fact that Khan's network only had uranium enrichment technology to sell that the Iranian program is based largely on uranium enrichment.

 

However, uranium enrichment is simply not an easy process. Even with what the Koreans were able to purchase from the Khan network, they were well behind even Iran in terms of being able to enrich uranium. On the other hand, North Korea probably already had enough fissile plutonium for 1 low yield bomb in 1994, and they had the fuel rods and expertise sitting around that could allow them to produce 5-10 more of them, possibly more. Without the Agreed Framework, those all would have been processed into bombs by 1996-1997. Because of the Agreed framework, the material was placed under U.N. Seal and monitored until the North Koreans removed the monitoring equipment and reprocessed the material while we were invading Iraq.

 

I never said there was no nuclear program at all in North Korea. They did manage to have dealings with the Khan network in the 90's. However, they were ungodly far behind even where Iran was in terms of uranium enrichment, but they were standing on the doorway of a plutonium bomb when the 94 accord was reached. Roughly 9-10 years of delay were created by having that material under U.N. lock and key, and if we had managed to keep it under lock and key, North Korea would today still be decades away from successful completion of a bomb through uranium enrichment.

[southsider2k5]

No, I'm afraid you're the one who is simply completely wrong. The Pakistani nuclear program focused almost entirely on Uranium production, because in the 1970's foreign powers began restricting sales of equipment to Pakistan that could be used in plutonium production. Pakistan was virtually unable to produce enriched plutonium before the turn of the century. On the other hand, the devices that AQ Khan built for the Pakistanis, which were tested successfully in 1998, were Uranium 235 fission devices, not plutonium devices.

 

Khan developed the program and the technology that would export his uranium enrichment experience. North Korea was consequently only able to deal with the Khan network on Uranium enrichment, because that was all that Khan had to offer. Plutonium enrichment is a totally different story, and North Korea had been working on that path for decades prior to the framework of 1994. It is in part because of the fact that Khan's network only had uranium enrichment technology to sell that the Iranian program is based largely on uranium enrichment.

 

However, uranium enrichment is simply not an easy process. Even with what the Koreans were able to purchase from the Khan network, they were well behind even Iran in terms of being able to enrich uranium. On the other hand, North Korea probably already had enough fissile plutonium for 1 low yield bomb in 1994, and they had the fuel rods and expertise sitting around that could allow them to produce 5-10 more of them, possibly more. Without the Agreed Framework, those all would have been processed into bombs by 1996-1997. Because of the Agreed framework, the material was placed under U.N. Seal and monitored until the North Koreans removed the monitoring equipment and reprocessed the material while we were invading Iraq.

 

I never said there was no nuclear program at all in North Korea. They did manage to have dealings with the Khan network in the 90's. However, they were ungodly far behind even where Iran was in terms of uranium enrichment, but they were standing on the doorway of a plutonium bomb when the 94 accord was reached. Roughly 9-10 years of delay were created by having that material under U.N. lock and key, and if we had managed to keep it under lock and key, North Korea would today still be decades away from successful completion of a bomb through uranium enrichment.

 

You seem to believe that is the only nuclear bomb material they have gotten ahold of. Its two separate sets of material. There is the stuff they did themselves, which is the public stuff, and there is the stuff that has been done underground from Pakistan. I hope you don't actually believe Mushareff and Kahn when they said they had nothing to do with the NK program. They had enough material from Kahn to potentially build only a couple of bombs, but when they uncapped their overt program because we quit bribing them not to do so, that is when they finished the materials to make the bomb they screwed up a few months ago.

[Texsox]

Isn't it cool to know we have the collective ability to destroy our planet and make it inhabitable for humans?

[Balta1701]

NYT (albiet based mainly on anonymous sources): US Had doubts about North Korean Uranium Drive

 

Here's the Post's version, with a much more excerptible header:

The Bush administration is backing away from its long-held assertions that North Korea has an active clandestine program to enrich uranium, leading some experts to believe that the original U.S. intelligence that started the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions may have been flawed.

 

The chief intelligence officer for North Korea, Joseph R. DeTrani, told Congress on Tuesday that while there is "high confidence" North Korea acquired materials that could be used in a "production-scale" uranium program, there is only "mid-confidence" such a program exists. Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, the chief negotiator for disarmament talks, told a conference last week in Washington that it is unclear whether North Korea ever mastered the production techniques necessary for such a program.

Edited March 1, 2007 by Balta1701

[Damen]

Second (and this is the reason for the "no-confidence" stamp), it shows that Bush and his people will say anything, no matter whether it's true, in order to shore up a political point. It means that U.S. intelligence has become completely corrupted.

 

It would be nice to know whether Iran is supplying Iraqi insurgents with particularly deadly explosives. It would be nice to know how far along the Iranians are coming with their (quite real) enriched-uranium program. It would be nice to know lots of things about this dangerous world. Or it would, at least, be nice to have a true sense of how much our intelligence agencies know about such things.

 

But we don't know how much these agencies know, because we can have no confidence in what the Bush administration tells us they know.

 

Why are senior officials suddenly saying that North Korea might not have an enriched-uranium program? No new information has come to light on the issue. They are saying this for one reason: President Bush recently agreed to a nuclear deal with the North Koreans; the deal says nothing about enriched uranium (it requires them only to freeze their plutonium-bomb program); so, in order to stave off the flood of criticism from Bush's conservative base, senior officials are saying that the enriched uranium was never a big deal to begin with.

 

It's unclear whether it was, or is, a big deal or not. But President Bush and his aides consistently claimed it was a big deal from October 2002 until just this week. It was such a big deal to them that they cited it as justification for pulling out of President Clinton's 1994 "Agreed Framework" accord, which had kept North Korea's nuclear reactor under constant monitoring by international inspectors and its nuclear fuel rods kept under lock and key.

 

After Bush withdrew from the Agreed Framework, the North Koreans booted the inspectors, unlocked the fuel rods, reprocessed them into plutonium, and built at least one atomic bomb (they exploded it in a test last fall) and possibly a half-dozen or so more.

 

...However, in October 2002, when Bush was looking for any excuse to back out of the Agreed Framework, senior officials said the evidence of enriched uranium was strong. Now, four and a half years later, when Bush is looking for reasons to justify a deal that's remarkably similar to the Agreed Framework (except it's not quite as tight, and the North Koreans have since become a nuclear-armed nation), senior officials are saying the evidence of enriched uranium is weak.

 

The evidence has always been ambiguous. Before, they hyped it to justify what they wanted to do. Now, they're downplaying it to justify what they've done.

 

http://www.slate.com/id/2160958/pagenum/1/

Edited March 2, 2007 by Damen

[kapkomet]

This just proves that George W. Bush is in control of EVERYTHING. /rolly

[Damen]

This just proves that George W. Bush is in control of EVERYTHING. /rolly

 

When you can't think of a way to defend the indefensible, fall back on lame sarcasm. Works every time.

[Rex Kickass]

Or it just means that George Bush is willing to cook intelligence to acheive his political aims, reality-based or not.

[kapkomet]

When you can't think of a way to defend the indefensible, fall back on lame sarcasm. Works every time.

I can defend it, but then you'd just call me a liar and a kool-aid Bush loving neo-con, so why should I bother?

[Balta1701]

Jerusalem Post.

The nuclear crisis with Iran was averted Saturday when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the entire Iranian nuclear program was traded to the New York Knicks for point guard Stephon Marbury. Iran will also get the Knicks' first two draft picks.

 

"Mahmoud's always wanted to be the first Persian player in the NBA," said Ayatollah Noochie Islamarama, coach of the Iranian national squad. "We kicked him off the team because frankly, even with elevator shoes he couldn't even score a lay-up, but when he heard about this opportunity, he decided to go for it."

[Damen]

I can defend it, but then you'd just call me a liar and a kool-aid Bush loving neo-con, so why should I bother?

 

I don't believe I've ever called you any of that, I think the only comments I've ever made towards you is in regards to your propensity to avoid having a substantive discussion in favor of using sarcasm so lame Ann Coulter wouldn't use it.

[kapkomet]

I don't believe I've ever called you any of that, I think the only comments I've ever made towards you is in regards to your propensity to avoid having a substantive discussion in favor of using sarcasm so lame Ann Coulter wouldn't use it.

Zing! Was that sarcasm I detect?