$700 Billion Bailout

[NorthSideSox72]

OK, so how in the hell did the failure for the first bailout vote fall on the GOP with most journalists, when they aren't in control of Congress?

I don't know - ask the voting public. They are doing what they usually do. The party of the current administration gets the flack for the economy, even though they often have little control over it. So, with the GOP in the White House and the Prez already not well-liked, the GOP becomes the scapegoat.

 

You don't see me blaming them though, do you?

 

[bmags]

OK, so how in the hell did the failure for the first bailout vote fall on the GOP with most journalists, when they aren't in control of Congress?

 

because they wanted that credit.

[southsider2k5]

because they wanted that credit.

 

And we all know that the GOP always gets what it wants

 

Seriously.

 

[southsider2k5]

I don't know - ask the voting public. They are doing what they usually do. The party of the current administration gets the flack for the economy, even though they often have little control over it. So, with the GOP in the White House and the Prez already not well-liked, the GOP becomes the scapegoat.

 

You don't see me blaming them though, do you?

 

That was more of a general question. I keep hearing that the majority party can only be held responsible for what passes Congress, then in the same thread, the minority party gets blamed for stopping legislation. It mades no sense to me.

[bmags]

And we all know that the GOP always gets what it wants

 

Seriously.

 

You don't think a block that big in Congress could do harm to a bill?

[southsider2k5]

You don't think a block that big in Congress could do harm to a bill?

 

All by itself, no.

[bmags]

All by itself, no.

 

In a bi-partisan situation like this, both parties needed to get majorities in their caucus to push it through, obviously there will be dissention and compromises that some house members find reprehensible. By most accounts, the House members took this opportunity to push their own, unreasonable plan that wouldn't get through, and distanced themselves from a weak party and leadership. A group of more than 100 house members in a caucus of one party, during a bi-partisan measure, can absolutely kill a bill. Could the dems have passed it with 100% yays? Yes, but that's not a realistic proposal. The dems did their part, the republicans didn't. And so the bill that ended up passed just needed some great pork projects, because, hey, if you're spending 700 billion, what's 100 billion more?

[southsider2k5]

In a bi-partisan situation like this, both parties needed to get majorities in their caucus to push it through, obviously there will be dissention and compromises that some house members find reprehensible. By most accounts, the House members took this opportunity to push their own, unreasonable plan that wouldn't get through, and distanced themselves from a weak party and leadership. A group of more than 100 house members in a caucus of one party, during a bi-partisan measure, can absolutely kill a bill. Could the dems have passed it with 100% yays? Yes, but that's not a realistic proposal. The dems did their part, the republicans didn't. And so the bill that ended up passed just needed some great pork projects, because, hey, if you're spending 700 billion, what's 100 billion more?

 

Then why does one party get all of the blame when something does pass, when it is just as bipartisian of an effort, such as the 91-8 vote for allowing Freddie and Fannie more free reign?

[Balta1701]

Then why does one party get all of the blame when something does pass, when it is just as bipartisian of an effort, such as the 91-8 vote for allowing Freddie and Fannie more free reign?

Because there's no simple calculation for who runs any particular bill. Give you an example...a large majority of the House and Senate voted for the Iraq war, clearly a bipartisan clusterf*ck. But people will correctly laugh in your face if you call that a Democrat-ran bill. On the other hand, McCain-Feingold had solid support as well, but it was sort of done while a good number of Republicans, including the President, were holding their nose and hoping that the Supreme Court would overturn parts of it, and so this gets cited as one example of McCain's Maverickiness.

[southsider2k5]

http://www.conservatismtoday.com/my_weblog...ime-blowup.html

 

Subprime Blowup Caused By Brett Favre Signing with Jets, and a Bunch of Other s***...Mainly a Bunch of Other s***.

A guest post by my friend Richard Ridgeway:

 

 

We don't really get, nor can we get all the information for consideration of the enormity of the "subprime" blowup. But we can fill in some large areas that haven't had great attention. Full disclosure- I am in the housing sector (since 1998) and still gainfully working in it.

 

The main blame being peddled is that people took out loans they couldn't repay. It is true that loans were made to people that couldn't repay, But there were many people who took out loans that they never intended to repay (when the favorable environment changed).

 

The brilliant SNL parody very accurately displays the Silicon Valley couple that bought condos to "flip" (buying houses and quickly reselling) in a rapidly rising housing market. Unknowingly to the Democrat machine of Fannie and Freddie, these flipper investors were the true catalysts of the meltdown. Without the "flipper investors" it's very likely the Dem's Fannie/Freddie fraud would still be churning unabated. You see, flippers were considered subprime borrowers as well. Those loans were/are grouped in with the low income borrowers. Here's why they are subprime and a demonstration of what happened:

 

Those flipper loans were not conventional loans. The flipper would only need to be asset worthy to qualify for an exotic 0 down ARM (adjustable rate mortgage) loan with no documentation. If they could show a bank account or asset that could potentially cover a default, they could qualify. As long as the market stayed hot and home prices escalated, they were more than OK. The flippers were sought after by the mortgage companies because of the quick turnaround.

 

A while back, in researching the subprime topic for individuals that I was contributing information to, I confirmed (to my satisfaction) my flippergate assumption. This information comes from the Cleveland Federal Reserve. Although it's from 2007- it's still pertinent, especially the historical perspective charting.

From The Cleveland Fed site:

 

Fed_chart

 

Note the subprime fixed rate borrowers (these were obviously buyers for a primary residence) meeting their obligations (to approx. 4% foreclosure starts). In fact, the subprime fixed rate default rate was trending down since 2004.

 

Now look at the subprime ARMs (investor-flippers would be in this group) have increased since 2004 (to approx. 10.5% per year foreclosure starts). Notice the historical perspective.

 

The NAHB (National Association of Home Builders) Housing Opportunity Index is more revealing.

 

It dates back to 1991. Look at the ARMs in particular for 2007 Quarter IV. Only 8% of the loans originated were ARMS. That's the lowest of any Quarter back to 1991. Compare 1994,'95 and '96 ARMs to those of 2004, 2005 and 2006 when the supposed "sub-prime slime" infiltration was at its peak. It's not even CLOSE. 1994 Q IV was 53% ARMs and 1995 QI was 52% !!! The highest of ARM share between 2001-2006 was Q III 2004 at 38%.

 

Tell me - where was the hand-wringing all of those years when ARMs were being peddled down the gullible public's throat? I'm at least smart enough to know ARMs weren't invented by "W" and smart enough to know there was plenty of foreclosures dating back to the beginning of mortgages in the U.S. It's those hot-market culprits ( Florida, Arizona, California, NY, etc.) where our flippergate culprits did their business.

 

What makes all this so important is that our flipper-investors usually bought multiple houses and at higher price tags than our low income subprimers. The rapid value decline in those hot-markets combined with the multiplier of the flipper's bad paper skewed the number of foreclosures and perceived value. Remember, all of the mortgages were pooled together in various packages and sold or used as collateral throughout the world. And with the subprime paper added in with prime paper, the servicer could get a higher interest return for those pools containing the subprime. For years the low income, subprime default would be a fairly well-known factor and financial institutions were accustomed to dealing with those predicted numbers. The poison pill of the flippers defaulting on their obligations was not accounted for.

 

The good news is that these type flippers and the loan instruments they used are gone. Their failure also helped expose the Democrats criminal dereliction involvement within Fannie and Freddie. The bad news is that the entire subprime party and their enablers (read Democrats) now head back to their previous hangout. It's called The FHA. And make no mistake. The FHA is where the subprime schemes were hatched. FHA loans are not considered subprime. But they have many characteristics of the subprime loans. With each passing year FHA loans dwindled as the subprime markets took hold. The more conventional market's idealists have seen how they could play the same game at a higher dollar level. They adapted, expanded and perfected those ideas into the exotic instruments that were the catalyst of the subprime blowup. The FHA has a dollar amount ceiling on loan limits. That ceiling has nearly tripled in most states since 2000. With those ceilings being constantly raised and the old housing mandates from Congress which still are in place-- we're just shuffling to refill the old swamp.

[Balta1701]

So there's one piece of data that's simply missing there. What percentage of the loans that the GSE's gave out were ARM's? The %age of mortgages being bought by the GSE's compared to the other banks declined dramatically as those types of mortgages took off.

[mr_genius]

What I thought was going to happen is. The banks are going to hoard their bailout money, not use it to give out loans any time soon.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/business...amp;oref=slogin

[NorthSideSox72]

What I thought was going to happen is. The banks are going to hoard their bailout money, not use it to give out loans any time soon.

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/business...amp;oref=slogin

Sort of.

 

Its not as if they are creating cash reserves with it. They are staying afloat with some of it. That will help more people keep their jobs, and later, get lending opened up faster.

 

I didn't think anyone was under the impression that this money was all going to go directly towards lending anyway. Only some of it.

 

[mr_genius]

Sort of.

 

Its not as if they are creating cash reserves with it. They are staying afloat with some of it. That will help more people keep their jobs, and later, get lending opened up faster.

 

I didn't think anyone was under the impression that this money was all going to go directly towards lending anyway. Only some of it.

 

The direct reason we were given for the bailout was that money was needed to be injected immediately into credit for small businesses and such. I knew that claim was incorrect as these banks were going to use the money to stabilize their failed corporations. A very small fraction of this money will be used for loans, we would have been better off letting these banks blow up and give the billions to banks that did not fail. At least reward banks that worked well, strengthen these entities. Oh, if these same lending demands that Barney and the Dems put on the banks to give out risky loans is still enforced these banks might get out of the home loan business completely and take their bailout money and use it to generate money in different avenues.

Edited October 20, 2008 by mr_genius

[NorthSideSox72]

The direct reason we were given for the bailout was that money was needed to be injected immediately into credit for small businesses and such. I knew that claim was incorrect as these banks were going to use the money to stabilize their failed corporations. A very small fraction of this money will be used for loans, we would have been better off letting these banks blow up and give the billions to banks that did not fail. At least reward banks that worked well. Oh, if these same lending demands that Barney and the Dems put on the banks to give out risky loans is still enforced these banks might get out of the home loan business completely and take their bailout money and use it to generate money in different avenues.

The direct reasonS (plural) included jobs protection, keeping financial order and preventing panic, generating liquidity, and yes, also, lending out the cash to open credit markets. But I never had the impression that was a single, only reason for it.

 

I do agree however, that what is missing is the second step that needed to come after the bailout - changing the rules.

 

[mr_genius]

The direct reasonS (plural) included jobs protection, keeping financial order and preventing panic, generating liquidity, and yes, also, lending out the cash to open credit markets. But I never had the impression that was a single, only reason for it.

 

I do agree however, that what is missing is the second step that needed to come after the bailout - changing the rules.

 

Well, there was tons of panic, so the bailout didn't really help with that. The bailout didn't generate liquidity by giving billions to failure, giving billions to banks that did not belly up would have generated more liquidity. As far as the jobs, when your corporation goes bankrupt you lose your job, it's a hard reality but a reality. Tossing trillions into failed corporations to save jobs hurts the long term stability of the economy. Rewarding failure will encourage more failure. Giving away a trillion dollars when we are 10 trillion in debt weakens our currency.

 

The best solution IMO would have been, if we were hell bent on a massive corporate welfare give away, to give the money to lenders that did not fail or create a massive fed bank.

Edited October 20, 2008 by mr_genius

[NorthSideSox72]

Well, there was tons of panic, so the bailout didn't really help with that. The bailout didn't generate liquidity by giving billions to failure, giving billions to banks that did not belly up would have generated more liquidity. As far as the jobs, when your corporation goes bankrupt you lose your job, it's a hard reality but a reality. Tossing trillions into failed corporations to save jobs hurts the long term stability of the economy. Rewarding failure will encourage more failure.

I am not saying the bailout was all good, or any good at all, in this case. I am just saying, I think you had a different idea than I did of what its purpose was.

 

And it DID help with the panic - the markets had their biggest single-week gain EVER last week. And it also helped liquidity for banks, as we saw no majors fail.

 

I know what you are saying about propping up bad businesses. And I agree, to an extent. But I think that some of the banks headed towards failure were too big to let fail. If Congress or the next President can follow up these packages with rules changes and enforcement that is meaningful, I think it works well as a group of efforts. We'll have to see if that second part happens.

 

 

[southsider2k5]

Well, there was tons of panic, so the bailout didn't really help with that. The bailout didn't generate liquidity by giving billions to failure, giving billions to banks that did not belly up would have generated more liquidity. As far as the jobs, when your corporation goes bankrupt you lose your job, it's a hard reality but a reality. Tossing trillions into failed corporations to save jobs hurts the long term stability of the economy. Rewarding failure will encourage more failure.

 

You do realize that for many banks to continue to exist under the current accounting laws that they HAD to keep some reserves so that they didn't fail, right?

 

[mr_genius]

You do realize that for many banks to continue to exist under the current accounting laws that they HAD to keep some reserves so that they didn't fail, right?

 

yea. thats why you don't bail them out. if anything you give the money to banks that didn't fail. we'll see how this money is spent, from what i'm hearing some might get out of the home loan business and use different avenues to generate revenue.

 

i do understand the logistics of another bank taking over all the bad loans though, the whole thing is a mess. i'm not against government action i just don't like the structure of the bailout that passed.

 

at least the market is surging today.

Edited October 20, 2008 by mr_genius

[Soxbadger]

Some what chicken or the egg here, if Banks dont have money in reserve they cant lend money. So in theory if they start building back their reserves eventually they will start lending again.

[southsider2k5]

yea. thats why you don't bail them out. if anything you give the money to banks that didn't fail. we'll see how this money is spent, from what i'm hearing some might get out of the home loan business and use different avenues to generate revenue.

 

i do understand the logistics of another bank taking over all the bad loans though, the whole thing is a mess. i'm not against government action i just don't like the structure of the bailout that passed.

 

at least the market is surging today.

 

You also realize that as interconnected as all of these banks are, if one top bank fails, odds are the majority of them fail. You are literally endorsing the very moves that got us into the great depression.

[mr_genius]

You also realize that as interconnected as all of these banks are, if one top bank fails, odds are the majority of them fail. You are literally endorsing the very moves that got us into the great depression.

 

stop asking me 'you do realize' questions.

 

here, some people that agree with me wrote this. these are legitimate concerns.

 

 

To the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate:

 

As economists, we want to express to Congress our great concern for the plan proposed by Treasury Secretary Paulson to deal with the financial crisis. We are well aware of the difficulty of the current financial situation and we agree with the need for bold action to ensure that the financial system continues to function. We see three fatal pitfalls in the currently proposed plan:

 

1) Its fairness. The plan is a subsidy to investors at taxpayers’ expense. Investors who took risks to earn profits must also bear the losses. Not every business failure carries systemic risk. The government can ensure a well-functioning financial industry, able to make new loans to creditworthy borrowers, without bailing out particular investors and institutions whose choices proved unwise.

 

2) Its ambiguity. Neither the mission of the new agency nor its oversight are clear. If taxpayers are to buy illiquid and opaque assets from troubled sellers, the terms, occasions, and methods of such purchases must be crystal clear ahead of time and carefully monitored afterwards.

 

3) Its long-term effects. If the plan is enacted, its effects will be with us for a generation. For all their recent troubles, America's dynamic and innovative private capital markets have brought the nation unparalleled prosperity. Fundamentally weakening those markets in order to calm short-run disruptions is desperately short-sighted.

 

For these reasons we ask Congress not to rush, to hold appropriate hearings, and to carefully consider the right course of action, and to wisely determine the future of the financial industry and the U.S. economy for years to come.

 

Signed (updated at 9/27/2008 6:00PM CT)

 

Acemoglu Daron (Massachussets Institute of Technology)

Ackerberg Daniel (UCLA)

Adler Michael (Columbia University)

Admati Anat R. (Stanford University)

Ales Laurence (Carnegie Mellon University)

Alexis Marcus (Northwestern University)

Alvarez Fernando (University of Chicago)

Andersen Torben (Northwestern University)

Baliga Sandeep (Northwestern University)

Banerjee Abhijit V. (Massachussets Institute of Technology)

Barankay Iwan (University of Pennsylvania)

Barry Brian (University of Chicago)

Bartkus James R. (Xavier University of Louisiana)

Becker Charles M. (Duke University)

Becker Robert A. (Indiana University)

Beim David (Columbia University)

Berk Jonathan (Stanford University)

Bisin Alberto (New York University)

Bittlingmayer George (University of Kansas)

Blank Emily (Howard University)

Boldrin Michele (Washington University)

Bollinger, Christopher R. (University of Kentucky)

Bossi, Luca (University of Miami)

Brooks Taggert J. (University of Wisconsin)

Brynjolfsson Erik (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Buera Francisco J.(UCLA)

Cabral Luis (New York University)

Camp Mary Elizabeth (Indiana University)

Carmel Jonathan (University of Michigan)

Carroll Christopher (Johns Hopkins University)

Cassar Gavin (University of Pennsylvania)

Chaney Thomas (University of Chicago)

Chari Varadarajan V. (University of Minnesota)

Chauvin Keith W. (University of Kansas)

Chintagunta Pradeep K. (University of Chicago)

Christiano Lawrence J. (Northwestern University)

Clementi, Gian Luca (New York University)

Cochrane John (University of Chicago)

Coleman John (Duke University)

Constantinides George M. (University of Chicago)

Cooley, Thomas (New York University)

Crain Robert (UC Berkeley)

Culp Christopher (University of Chicago)

Da Zhi (University of Notre Dame)

Darity, William (Duke University)

Davis Morris (University of Wisconsin)

De Marzo Peter (Stanford University)

Dubé Jean-Pierre H. (University of Chicago)

Edlin Aaron (UC Berkeley)

Eichenbaum Martin (Northwestern University)

Ely Jeffrey (Northwestern University)

Eraslan Hülya K. K.(Johns Hopkins University)

Fair Ray (Yale University)

Faulhaber Gerald (University of Pennsylvania)

Feldmann Sven (University of Melbourne)

Fernandez, Raquel (New York University)

Fernandez-Villaverde Jesus (University of Pennsylvania)

Fohlin Caroline (Johns Hopkins University)

Fox Jeremy T. (University of Chicago)

Frank Murray Z.(University of Minnesota)

Frenzen Jonathan (University of Chicago)

Fuchs William (University of Chicago)

Fudenberg Drew (Harvard University)

Gabaix Xavier (New York University)

Gao Paul (Notre Dame University)

Garicano Luis (University of Chicago)

Gerakos Joseph J. (University of Chicago)

Gibbs Michael (University of Chicago)

Glomm Gerhard (Indiana University)

Goettler Ron (University of Chicago)

Goldin Claudia (Harvard University)

Gordon Robert J. (Northwestern University)

Greenstone Michael (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Gregory, Karl D. (Oakland University)

Guadalupe Maria (Columbia University)

Guerrieri Veronica (University of Chicago)

Hagerty Kathleen (Northwestern University)

Hamada Robert S. (University of Chicago)

Hansen Lars (University of Chicago)

Harris Milton (University of Chicago)

Hart Oliver (Harvard University)

Hazlett Thomas W. (George Mason University)

Heaton John (University of Chicago)

Heckman James (University of Chicago - Nobel Laureate)

Henderson David R. (Hoover Institution)

Henisz, Witold (University of Pennsylvania)

Hertzberg Andrew (Columbia University)

Hite Gailen (Columbia University)

Hitsch Günter J. (University of Chicago)

Hodrick Robert J. (Columbia University)

Hollifield Burton (Carnegie Mellon University)

Hopenhayn Hugo (UCLA)

Hurst Erik (University of Chicago)

Imrohoroglu Ayse (University of Southern California)

Isakson Hans (University of Northern Iowa)

Israel Ronen (London Business School)

Jaffee Dwight M. (UC Berkeley)

Jagannathan Ravi (Northwestern University)

Jenter Dirk (Stanford University)

Jones Charles M. (Columbia Business School)

Jovanovic Boyan (New York University)

Kaboski Joseph P. (Ohio State University)

Kahn Matthew (UCLA)

Kaplan Ethan (Stockholm University)

Karaivanov Alexander (Simon Fraser University)

Karolyi, Andrew (Ohio State University)

Kashyap Anil (University of Chicago)

Keim Donald B (University of Pennsylvania)

Ketkar Suhas L (Vanderbilt University)

Kiesling Lynne (Northwestern University)

Klenow Pete (Stanford University)

Koch Paul (University of Kansas)

Kocherlakota Narayana (University of Minnesota)

Koijen Ralph S.J. (University of Chicago)

Kondo Jiro (Northwestern University)

Korteweg Arthur (Stanford University)

Kortum Samuel (University of Chicago)

Krueger Dirk (University of Pennsylvania)

Ledesma Patricia (Northwestern University)

Lee Lung-fei (Ohio State University)

Leeper Eric M. (Indiana University)

Letson David (University of Miami)

Leuz Christian (University of Chicago)

Levine David I.(UC Berkeley)

Levine David K.(Washington University)

Levy David M. (George Mason University)

Linnainmaa Juhani (University of Chicago)

Lucas Robert (University of Chicago - Nobel Laureate)

Ludvigson, Sydney C. (New York University)

Luttmer Erzo G.J. (University of Minnesota)

Manski Charles F. (Northwestern University)

Martin Ian (Stanford University)

Mayer Christopher (Columbia University)

Mazzeo Michael (Northwestern University)

McDonald Robert (Northwestern University)

Meadow Scott F. (University of Chicago)

Meeropol, Michael (Western New England College)

Mehra Rajnish (UC Santa Barbara)

Mian Atif (University of Chicago)

Middlebrook Art (University of Chicago)

Miguel Edward (UC Berkeley)

Miravete Eugenio J. (University of Texas at Austin)

Miron Jeffrey (Harvard University)

Moeller, Thomas (Texas Christian University)

Moretti Enrico (UC Berkeley)

Moriguchi Chiaki (Northwestern University)

Moro Andrea (Vanderbilt University)

Morse Adair (University of Chicago)

Mortensen Dale T. (Northwestern University)

Mortimer Julie Holland (Harvard University)

Moskowitz, Tobias J. (University of Chicago)

Munger Michael C. (Duke University)

Muralidharan Karthik (UC San Diego)

Nair Harikesh (Stanford University)

Nanda Dhananjay (University of Miami)

Nevo Aviv (Northwestern University)

Ohanian Lee (UCLA)

Pagliari Joseph (University of Chicago)

Papanikolaou Dimitris (Northwestern University)

Parker Jonathan (Northwestern University)

Paul Evans (Ohio State University)

Pearce David (New York University)

Pejovich Svetozar (Steve) (Texas A&M University)

Peltzman Sam (University of Chicago)

Perri Fabrizio (University of Minnesota)

Phelan Christopher (University of Minnesota)

Piazzesi Monika (Stanford University)

Pippenger, Michael K. (University of Alaska)

Piskorski Tomasz (Columbia University)

Platt Brennan C. (Brigham Young University)

Rampini Adriano (Duke University)

Ray, Debraj (New York University)

Reagan Patricia (Ohio State University)

Reich Michael (UC Berkeley)

Reuben Ernesto (Northwestern University)

Rizzo, Mario (New York University)

Roberts Michael (University of Pennsylvania)

Robinson David (Duke University)

Rogers Michele (Northwestern University)

Rotella Elyce (Indiana University)

Roussanov Nikolai (University of Pennsylvania)

Routledge Bryan R. (Carnegie Mellon University)

Ruud Paul (Vassar College)

Safford Sean (University of Chicago)

Samaniego Roberto (George Washington University)

Sandbu Martin E. (University of Pennsylvania)

Sapienza Paola (Northwestern University)

Savor Pavel (University of Pennsylvania)

Schaniel William C. (University of West Georgia)

Scharfstein David (Harvard University)

Seim Katja (University of Pennsylvania)

Seru Amit (University of Chicago)

Shang-Jin Wei (Columbia University)

Shimer Robert (University of Chicago)

Shore Stephen H. (Johns Hopkins University)

Siegel Ron (Northwestern University)

Smith David C. (University of Virginia)

Smith Vernon L.(Chapman University- Nobel Laureate)

Sorensen Morten (Columbia University)

Spatt Chester (Carnegie Mellon University)

Spear Stephen (Carnegie Mellon University)

Stevenson Betsey (University of Pennsylvania)

Stokey Nancy (University of Chicago)

Strahan Philip (Boston College)

Strebulaev Ilya (Stanford University)

Sufi Amir (University of Chicago)

Tabarrok Alex (George Mason University)

Taylor Alan M. (UC Davis)

Thompson Tim (Northwestern University)

Troske Kenneth (University of Kentucky)

Tschoegl Adrian E. (University of Pennsylvania)

Uhlig Harald (University of Chicago)

Ulrich, Maxim (Columbia University)

Van Buskirk Andrew (University of Chicago)

Vargas Hernan (University of Phoenix)

Veronesi Pietro (University of Chicago)

Vissing-Jorgensen Annette (Northwestern University)

Wacziarg Romain (UCLA)

Walker Douglas O. (Regent University)

Walker, Todd (Indiana University)

Weill Pierre-Olivier (UCLA)

Williamson Samuel H. (Miami University)

Witte Mark (Northwestern University)

Wolfenzon, Daniel (Columbia University)

Wolfers Justin (University of Pennsylvania)

Woutersen Tiemen (Johns Hopkins University)

Wu Yangru (Rutgers University)

Yue Vivian Z. (New York University)

Zingales Luigi (University of Chicago)

Zitzewitz Eric (Dartmouth College)

Edited October 21, 2008 by mr_genius

[bmags]

I'm much much much more happy with the current model than the previous one.

[southsider2k5]

stop asking me 'you do realize' questions.

 

here, some people that agree with me wrote this. these are legitimate concerns.

 

 

 

 

Signed (updated at 9/27/2008 6:00PM CT)

 

Acemoglu Daron (Massachussets Institute of Technology)

Ackerberg Daniel (UCLA)

Adler Michael (Columbia University)

Admati Anat R. (Stanford University)

Ales Laurence (Carnegie Mellon University)

Alexis Marcus (Northwestern University)

Alvarez Fernando (University of Chicago)

Andersen Torben (Northwestern University)

Baliga Sandeep (Northwestern University)

Banerjee Abhijit V. (Massachussets Institute of Technology)

Barankay Iwan (University of Pennsylvania)

Barry Brian (University of Chicago)

Bartkus James R. (Xavier University of Louisiana)

Becker Charles M. (Duke University)

Becker Robert A. (Indiana University)

Beim David (Columbia University)

Berk Jonathan (Stanford University)

Bisin Alberto (New York University)

Bittlingmayer George (University of Kansas)

Blank Emily (Howard University)

Boldrin Michele (Washington University)

Bollinger, Christopher R. (University of Kentucky)

Bossi, Luca (University of Miami)

Brooks Taggert J. (University of Wisconsin)

Brynjolfsson Erik (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Buera Francisco J.(UCLA)

Cabral Luis (New York University)

Camp Mary Elizabeth (Indiana University)

Carmel Jonathan (University of Michigan)

Carroll Christopher (Johns Hopkins University)

Cassar Gavin (University of Pennsylvania)

Chaney Thomas (University of Chicago)

Chari Varadarajan V. (University of Minnesota)

Chauvin Keith W. (University of Kansas)

Chintagunta Pradeep K. (University of Chicago)

Christiano Lawrence J. (Northwestern University)

Clementi, Gian Luca (New York University)

Cochrane John (University of Chicago)

Coleman John (Duke University)

Constantinides George M. (University of Chicago)

Cooley, Thomas (New York University)

Crain Robert (UC Berkeley)

Culp Christopher (University of Chicago)

Da Zhi (University of Notre Dame)

Darity, William (Duke University)

Davis Morris (University of Wisconsin)

De Marzo Peter (Stanford University)

Dubé Jean-Pierre H. (University of Chicago)

Edlin Aaron (UC Berkeley)

Eichenbaum Martin (Northwestern University)

Ely Jeffrey (Northwestern University)

Eraslan Hülya K. K.(Johns Hopkins University)

Fair Ray (Yale University)

Faulhaber Gerald (University of Pennsylvania)

Feldmann Sven (University of Melbourne)

Fernandez, Raquel (New York University)

Fernandez-Villaverde Jesus (University of Pennsylvania)

Fohlin Caroline (Johns Hopkins University)

Fox Jeremy T. (University of Chicago)

Frank Murray Z.(University of Minnesota)

Frenzen Jonathan (University of Chicago)

Fuchs William (University of Chicago)

Fudenberg Drew (Harvard University)

Gabaix Xavier (New York University)

Gao Paul (Notre Dame University)

Garicano Luis (University of Chicago)

Gerakos Joseph J. (University of Chicago)

Gibbs Michael (University of Chicago)

Glomm Gerhard (Indiana University)

Goettler Ron (University of Chicago)

Goldin Claudia (Harvard University)

Gordon Robert J. (Northwestern University)

Greenstone Michael (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Gregory, Karl D. (Oakland University)

Guadalupe Maria (Columbia University)

Guerrieri Veronica (University of Chicago)

Hagerty Kathleen (Northwestern University)

Hamada Robert S. (University of Chicago)

Hansen Lars (University of Chicago)

Harris Milton (University of Chicago)

Hart Oliver (Harvard University)

Hazlett Thomas W. (George Mason University)

Heaton John (University of Chicago)

Heckman James (University of Chicago - Nobel Laureate)

Henderson David R. (Hoover Institution)

Henisz, Witold (University of Pennsylvania)

Hertzberg Andrew (Columbia University)

Hite Gailen (Columbia University)

Hitsch Günter J. (University of Chicago)

Hodrick Robert J. (Columbia University)

Hollifield Burton (Carnegie Mellon University)

Hopenhayn Hugo (UCLA)

Hurst Erik (University of Chicago)

Imrohoroglu Ayse (University of Southern California)

Isakson Hans (University of Northern Iowa)

Israel Ronen (London Business School)

Jaffee Dwight M. (UC Berkeley)

Jagannathan Ravi (Northwestern University)

Jenter Dirk (Stanford University)

Jones Charles M. (Columbia Business School)

Jovanovic Boyan (New York University)

Kaboski Joseph P. (Ohio State University)

Kahn Matthew (UCLA)

Kaplan Ethan (Stockholm University)

Karaivanov Alexander (Simon Fraser University)

Karolyi, Andrew (Ohio State University)

Kashyap Anil (University of Chicago)

Keim Donald B (University of Pennsylvania)

Ketkar Suhas L (Vanderbilt University)

Kiesling Lynne (Northwestern University)

Klenow Pete (Stanford University)

Koch Paul (University of Kansas)

Kocherlakota Narayana (University of Minnesota)

Koijen Ralph S.J. (University of Chicago)

Kondo Jiro (Northwestern University)

Korteweg Arthur (Stanford University)

Kortum Samuel (University of Chicago)

Krueger Dirk (University of Pennsylvania)

Ledesma Patricia (Northwestern University)

Lee Lung-fei (Ohio State University)

Leeper Eric M. (Indiana University)

Letson David (University of Miami)

Leuz Christian (University of Chicago)

Levine David I.(UC Berkeley)

Levine David K.(Washington University)

Levy David M. (George Mason University)

Linnainmaa Juhani (University of Chicago)

Lucas Robert (University of Chicago - Nobel Laureate)

Ludvigson, Sydney C. (New York University)

Luttmer Erzo G.J. (University of Minnesota)

Manski Charles F. (Northwestern University)

Martin Ian (Stanford University)

Mayer Christopher (Columbia University)

Mazzeo Michael (Northwestern University)

McDonald Robert (Northwestern University)

Meadow Scott F. (University of Chicago)

Meeropol, Michael (Western New England College)

Mehra Rajnish (UC Santa Barbara)

Mian Atif (University of Chicago)

Middlebrook Art (University of Chicago)

Miguel Edward (UC Berkeley)

Miravete Eugenio J. (University of Texas at Austin)

Miron Jeffrey (Harvard University)

Moeller, Thomas (Texas Christian University)

Moretti Enrico (UC Berkeley)

Moriguchi Chiaki (Northwestern University)

Moro Andrea (Vanderbilt University)

Morse Adair (University of Chicago)

Mortensen Dale T. (Northwestern University)

Mortimer Julie Holland (Harvard University)

Moskowitz, Tobias J. (University of Chicago)

Munger Michael C. (Duke University)

Muralidharan Karthik (UC San Diego)

Nair Harikesh (Stanford University)

Nanda Dhananjay (University of Miami)

Nevo Aviv (Northwestern University)

Ohanian Lee (UCLA)

Pagliari Joseph (University of Chicago)

Papanikolaou Dimitris (Northwestern University)

Parker Jonathan (Northwestern University)

Paul Evans (Ohio State University)

Pearce David (New York University)

Pejovich Svetozar (Steve) (Texas A&M University)

Peltzman Sam (University of Chicago)

Perri Fabrizio (University of Minnesota)

Phelan Christopher (University of Minnesota)

Piazzesi Monika (Stanford University)

Pippenger, Michael K. (University of Alaska)

Piskorski Tomasz (Columbia University)

Platt Brennan C. (Brigham Young University)

Rampini Adriano (Duke University)

Ray, Debraj (New York University)

Reagan Patricia (Ohio State University)

Reich Michael (UC Berkeley)

Reuben Ernesto (Northwestern University)

Rizzo, Mario (New York University)

Roberts Michael (University of Pennsylvania)

Robinson David (Duke University)

Rogers Michele (Northwestern University)

Rotella Elyce (Indiana University)

Roussanov Nikolai (University of Pennsylvania)

Routledge Bryan R. (Carnegie Mellon University)

Ruud Paul (Vassar College)

Safford Sean (University of Chicago)

Samaniego Roberto (George Washington University)

Sandbu Martin E. (University of Pennsylvania)

Sapienza Paola (Northwestern University)

Savor Pavel (University of Pennsylvania)

Schaniel William C. (University of West Georgia)

Scharfstein David (Harvard University)

Seim Katja (University of Pennsylvania)

Seru Amit (University of Chicago)

Shang-Jin Wei (Columbia University)

Shimer Robert (University of Chicago)

Shore Stephen H. (Johns Hopkins University)

Siegel Ron (Northwestern University)

Smith David C. (University of Virginia)

Smith Vernon L.(Chapman University- Nobel Laureate)

Sorensen Morten (Columbia University)

Spatt Chester (Carnegie Mellon University)

Spear Stephen (Carnegie Mellon University)

Stevenson Betsey (University of Pennsylvania)

Stokey Nancy (University of Chicago)

Strahan Philip (Boston College)

Strebulaev Ilya (Stanford University)

Sufi Amir (University of Chicago)

Tabarrok Alex (George Mason University)

Taylor Alan M. (UC Davis)

Thompson Tim (Northwestern University)

Troske Kenneth (University of Kentucky)

Tschoegl Adrian E. (University of Pennsylvania)

Uhlig Harald (University of Chicago)

Ulrich, Maxim (Columbia University)

Van Buskirk Andrew (University of Chicago)

Vargas Hernan (University of Phoenix)

Veronesi Pietro (University of Chicago)

Vissing-Jorgensen Annette (Northwestern University)

Wacziarg Romain (UCLA)

Walker Douglas O. (Regent University)

Walker, Todd (Indiana University)

Weill Pierre-Olivier (UCLA)

Williamson Samuel H. (Miami University)

Witte Mark (Northwestern University)

Wolfenzon, Daniel (Columbia University)

Wolfers Justin (University of Pennsylvania)

Woutersen Tiemen (Johns Hopkins University)

Wu Yangru (Rutgers University)

Yue Vivian Z. (New York University)

Zingales Luigi (University of Chicago)

Zitzewitz Eric (Dartmouth College)

 

The only other way is to change the accounting system. You can post all of the names you like, but without a banking system, we don't exist.

 

[mr_genius]

I'm much much much more happy with the current model than the previous one.

 

i do like the increase in the FDICs deposit insurance cap.