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Nuclear Iran


Jenksismyhero

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QUOTE (Balta1701 @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 01:07 PM)
Why?

 

Because any military option is out the window at that point (radiation), and you'd have to rely on economic sanctions (which don't work) or that Russia would step in and tell them to stop (not likely).

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QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 02:09 PM)
Because any military option is out the window at that point (radiation), and you'd have to rely on economic sanctions (which don't work) or that Russia would step in and tell them to stop (not likely).

Let's specify here...military action to knock out the genuinely legal under international law and treaty nuclear reactor might be out the window, but military action to stop a nuclear weapons processing or enrichment program is not.

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QUOTE (girlslikebaseballtoo#26 @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 02:13 PM)
PERFECT!!

 

I have a dream last night about the world ending and this morning I stumble across this ...ON A SITE THAT IS SUPPOSED TO MAKE ME HAPPY ..wtf?!?! :unsure:

Hate to have to do this for this sort of post...but if you're going to post in this forum, there is a thread pinned at the top containing the forum guidelines which you must read and acknowledge prior to posting in here.

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QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 02:05 PM)
nothing will stop them once the reactor starts

 

Not true. It also remains to be seen about how the fuel is being used and removed. If the Russians are loading the fuel in, and removing the fuel, it is not likely that Iran will get access to plutonium. Further, if fuel rods are being exchanged less often than every three or four months or so - the likelihood that this is being used for anything other than energy needs is also not likely, because any plutonium left would be too unstable to be properly weaponized.

 

If Iran is following its agreement with Russia in getting Bahshehr online, the ability to weaponize fuel from the plant would seem to be pretty limited.

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I love the hypocrisy of the US thinking we should be able to decide who gets to play with uranium or plutonium, or whatever it is that they make nuclear weapons from, and who does not...

Edited by iamshack
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QUOTE (iamshack @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 02:44 PM)
I love the hypocrisy of the US thinking we should be able to decide who gets to play with uranium or plutonium, or whatever it is that they make nuclear weapons from, and who does not...

Technically, by the Nonproliferation treaty, the U.S. (and the few other nuclear powers) do in fact have some rights to decide who gets to play with materials that could be used for nuclear weaponry. We don't have a right to say to Iran that they can't build a nuclear power plant, but we do have the right to demand inspections and monitoring such that they're not attempting to weaponize the products. We also have a right to know where all of their facilities are which have been working on enriching uranium (this has been Iran's key violation in the past; building processing sites but concealing them from the IAEA).

 

Other countries gave the nuclear powers those rights in the NPT specifically to avoid nuclear arms races of the sort that happened between the superpowers, and there is therefore a substantial benefit to those smaller countries from that deal.

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QUOTE (Rex Kicka** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 01:29 PM)
Not true. It also remains to be seen about how the fuel is being used and removed. If the Russians are loading the fuel in, and removing the fuel, it is not likely that Iran will get access to plutonium. Further, if fuel rods are being exchanged less often than every three or four months or so - the likelihood that this is being used for anything other than energy needs is also not likely, because any plutonium left would be too unstable to be properly weaponized.

 

If Iran is following its agreement with Russia in getting Bahshehr online, the ability to weaponize fuel from the plant would seem to be pretty limited.

 

FYI typical outage cycles are 18 to 24 months. Shutting the plant down every few months would be a financial disaster and a pretty clear indication that something was amiss.

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QUOTE (iamshack @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 01:44 PM)
I love the hypocrisy of the US thinking we should be able to decide who gets to play with uranium or plutonium, or whatever it is that they make nuclear weapons from, and who does not...

 

Yeah because the US has no legitimate interest in this situation.

 

 

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QUOTE (Rex Kicka** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 01:29 PM)
Not true. It also remains to be seen about how the fuel is being used and removed. If the Russians are loading the fuel in, and removing the fuel, it is not likely that Iran will get access to plutonium. Further, if fuel rods are being exchanged less often than every three or four months or so - the likelihood that this is being used for anything other than energy needs is also not likely, because any plutonium left would be too unstable to be properly weaponized.

 

If Iran is following its agreement with Russia in getting Bahshehr online, the ability to weaponize fuel from the plant would seem to be pretty limited.

 

Yeah, well, we'll see I guess. Iran wasn't supposed to get a nuclear reactor, but nothing stopped them.

 

I'll give it 2 years before they have a weapon. Probably 2.1 before they threaten to use it.

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QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 01:03 PM)
Yeah because the US has no legitimate interest in this situation.

That isn't the point.

 

The point is that the US has done whatever the hell it has wanted over the course of the last 75 years, including creating this bomb, burning fossil fuels, polluting the s*** out of anything and everything at its leisure, then when another country wants to experience the benefits of these technologies, we raise all these bs humanitarian arguments that sure as s*** never stopped us.

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QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 02:07 PM)
Yeah, well, we'll see I guess. Iran wasn't supposed to get a nuclear reactor, but nothing stopped them.

 

I'll give it 2 years before they have a weapon. Probably 2.1 before they threaten to use it.

 

 

How will this reactor allow them have a functional nuclear weapon in 2 years?

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QUOTE (iamshack @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 02:11 PM)
That isn't the point.

 

The point is that the US has done whatever the hell it has wanted over the course of the last 75 years, including creating this bomb, burning fossil fuels, polluting the s*** out of anything and everything at its leisure, then when another country wants to experience the benefits of these technologies, we raise all these bs humanitarian arguments that sure as s*** never stopped us.

 

If they didn't have leaders calling to eradicate entire ethnicities, then I would see your point. But that's not why they're seeking nuclear technology.

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QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 01:17 PM)
If they didn't have leaders calling to eradicate entire ethnicities, then I would see your point. But that's not why they're seeking nuclear technology.

So if this was a nation that, in our opinion, was not bats*** crazy, we would be fine with them acquiring the bomb?

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QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 03:19 PM)
Most studies guesstimate that they'll have a weapon in 2-3 years

As they have for 20 years.

Israel and the United States believed in 1992 that Iran would attain a military nuclear capability within eight to 10 years. In 1995 ACDA Director John Holum testified that Iran could have the bomb by 2003, though by 1997 he testified that Iran could have the bomb by 2005-2007. In the mid-1990's the view of the United States government was that Iran was implementing a military nuclear program that could achieve a weapons capability within five years, at the time meaning by the year 2000. As of 1998 the estimate of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) was that Iranian efforts could result in the development of a nuclear device by the middle of the next decade, that is, by the year 2005.

 

In a statement to the US public made 7 January 1998 and broadcast by Cable News Network, President Sayed Mohamad Khatami said, "we are not a nuclear power and do not intend to become one. We have accepted IAEA safeguards and our facilities are routinely inspected by that agency." Some western observers asserted that Khatami, a moderate cleric elected president of Iran in May 1997, had not taken charge of Iran's nuclear development program. Despite Khatami's emergence as a political figure, developments suggested that he was not in control of the military and security sphere.

 

In January 2000, marking a significant departure from previous assessments, the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that Iran might now be able to make a nuclear weapon. This evaluation was not based on evidence that Iran's efforts had achieved a breakthrough, but rather on the fact that the United States could not track with great certainty increased efforts by Iran to acquire nuclear materials and technology. Analysts at other intelligence agencies believed that Iran's efforts were still moving, albeit very slowly.

 

In an April 2004 speech, John R Bolton, the Bush Administration's primary policymaker on weapons of mass destruction, said: "If we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons."

 

On 10 November 2004 the Wall Street Journal reported that European officials believed Iran was five or six years away from possessing nuclear weapons. The European goal in the proposed deal on suspension of Iran's uranium-enrichment activities was to ensure that Iran got no closer than that. Some American estimates were that as of late 2004 Iran was only one year away from a bomb, while others estimated that Iran could have enough material for one bomb in 1.5 to 2 years, meaning by early to mid-2005.

 

In January 2005 IDF Intelligence Branch chief Major General Aharon Ze'evi Farkash stated in a presentation at the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa that if Iran's uranium enrichment activities were not halted, it could develop its first atomic bomb at some point between 2007 and 2009. At that time, he said that Iran was six months away from enriching uranium, a step that had been described as the "point of no return."

 

On 16 February 2005 Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, US Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, testified that "Iran is likely continuing nuclear weapon-related endeavors in an effort to become the dominant regional power and deter what it perceives as the potential for US or Israeli attacks. We judge Iran is devoting significant resources to its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. Unless constrained by a nuclear non-proliferation agreement, Tehran probably will have the ability to produce nuclear weapons early in the next decade."

 

In June 2005, Robert G. Joseph, undersecretary of state for arms control, was asked whether Iran had a nuclear effort underway, Bolton's successor, said: "I don't know quite how to answer that because we don't have perfect information or perfect understanding. But the Iranian record, plus what the Iranian leaders have said...lead us to conclude that we have to be highly skeptical."

 

On 1 August 2005 the The Jerusalem Post reported that the Israeli government estimated that Iran would be able to build an atomic bomb as soon as the year 2008, "if all goes well for it" in the words of a high ranking IDF commander. The new estimate indicated that Iran will "probably" have an atomic bomb by 2012. The anonymous Israeli military officer indicated that Israel's assessement, in contrast to earlier views, that Iran did not have a separate military nuclear program, and that Iran's nuclear weapons effort was entirely dependent on the overt civilian effort. The officer was quoted as saying "We no longer think that a secret military track runs independent of the civilian one... If it were, then they could acquire weapons in 2007... Now we think the military track is dependent on the civilian one. However, from a certain point it will be able to run independently. But not earlier than 2008." The "point of no return" was said to be within a few months to a year.

 

On 2 August 2005 The Washington Post reported a new US National Intelligence Estimate had concluded that Iran was about a decade away from acquiring nuclear weapons, doubling the previous estimate of five years. The NIE expressed uncertainty about whether Iran's leaders had made a decision to build a nuclear arsenal, though "it is the judgment of the intelligence community that, left to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons." The new estimate judged that Iran was unlikely to produce sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium before "early to mid-next decade." The timeline was depicted reflecting a program "moving full speed ahead without major technical obstacles." As with the Israeli estimate, the new NIE concluded that it was improbable that Iran's military had covert enrichment effort separate from the overt effort.

 

In November 2007 another US National Intelligence Estimate was published. In it, it stated that revised intelligence suggested that Tehran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. It also said that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon was late 2009, but that this was very unlikely. There was moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. This was widely recieved as evidence that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program and was not developing nuclear weapons at all. While the NIE stated that it did not set out to answer that question, it defined "nuclear weapons program" as Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work. Halting this process could also have meant that Iran had finished this work and was capable, after 2003, of construction nuclear weapons, simply lacking the nuclear material (HEU) to do so.

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QUOTE (Jenksismyb**** @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 02:03 PM)
Yeah because the US has no legitimate interest in this situation.

 

Legitimate interest, sure, but that doesn't necessarily mean a legitimate authority to tell other countries what they may or may not build for (ostensibly) peaceful purposes.

 

But the NPT and the IAEA complicate that matter and I won't pretend to know if the US really does have legitimate authority on this issue.

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QUOTE (iamshack @ Aug 17, 2010 -> 02:19 PM)
So if this was a nation that, in our opinion, was not bats*** crazy, we would be fine with them acquiring the bomb?

 

And not against our interests, yes.

 

Edit: I know nothing of the NPT, so maybe Balta is right. But I think if an ally of ours wanted a nuclear weapon we wouldn't make a big deal out of it.

Edited by Jenksismybitch
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