Arguments for keeping managers, Dunn's value, etc.

[caulfield12]

Q.The highest-paid managers get paid multiples less than the highest-paid players. J.C., do you come up with estimates on the value of managers? More specifically, if you were the agent for the best manager in MLB (whomever you think that is), could you argue that manager pay should be doubled? – Barbara

 

A.If I had added another chapter to the book, it would have been on the value of managers. In fact, my most recent project involved quantifying the impact that managers have on players, looking at how player performance changed under different managers. Though I found a few managers who had “statistically significant” effects on their players (positive and negative), no manager helped both hitters and pitchers. I estimated the impact of several factors on performance, and when I compared models that included managers versus those that did not, there was very little impact. In summary, managers appear to have very little effect on baseball player performance, and this really shouldn’t be surprising given that most of baseball involves one-on-one contests between hitters and pitchers.

 

This then leads to the question: why do some teams pay managers big salaries if they are not important? I have a theory that teams use managers to signal to fans that they are improving. If your team is struggling, you can’t quickly replace a roster of 25 guys and improve overnight. Managers can be quickly replaced; thus, if fans perceive that managers do impact performance — even if they don’t — then teams can falsely signal improvement to fans. Fans who would otherwise stay at home now go to the ballpark. I tested this hypothesis for the past three decades by examining how attendance changed after replacing a manager. In the 2000s, I found that managerial replacements led to an increased attendance of about 1,000 fans per game. I did not observe similar effects in the 1990s and 1980s, though. It’s unclear why the effect is observed more recently, but not in the past. Maybe the growth in fandom in the present has produced more sensitive fans, but it’s hard to know. You can read my working paper here.

 

 

Q.I’m having more and more trouble nowadays discussing baseball with my cousin, as he’s the type who would hear the words “valuation model” and immediate attempt to dismiss any of the following points. I’m sure you encounter this too. How do you react to this? – Katie

 

A.Well, I understand this reaction, and though I think about baseball a little more intensely than most of my baseball-fan friends, I find most people are just as interested in the same issues I am. The difference is the language that stat-savvy (or sabermetric) fans often try to force on others. While I use terms like marginal revenue product and OPS in my own work, I also try and explain these concepts in a familiar lexicon. For example, let’s say your grandfather complains about Adam Dunn’s .250 batting average, high strikeouts and horrible defense. If you respond, well he’s got a .900 OPS, which more than makes up for his strikeouts and bad defense, and his MRP is $12 million, he’ll spit tobacco in your eye (or at least mine would). Instead, you could say, “Well, while he doesn’t hit for average, he gets on base a lot with walks, and when he does get on he normally gets further than first base. When you look at all the things he does and how that translates into winning, and the revenue that teams get from winning, his worth is about $12 million to the bottom line.” You just explained OPS and MRP without the terms. There is nothing in sabermetrics than cannot be explained in everyday baseball language.

 

 

Q.The Mets’ poor performance each of the past few years can’t be blamed on a low payroll, as they are almost always at the top of the list in terms of team payroll. They have to be at the top of your list of the most poorly run franchises in Chapter 6, right? I haven’t read the book yet but had to ask. – Mitch

 

A.Right at the top of the list of the worst-managed teams of the 2000s. Not only did the Mets spend a lot, they didn’t win much either. The Mets problem is easy to identify: The Mets have a habit of signing high-dollar stars rather than focusing on building a better internal scouting structure. The Mets have developed some good prospects, but they have a penchant for buying players when they are expensive. Some examples of bad contracts include signing Oliver Perez to a three-year, $36 million contract in 2009, signing Francisco Rodriguez to a three-year, $37 million contract in 2009, and signing Luis Castillo to a four-year, $25 million contract in 2008. In 2010, the team was not ready to contend yet signed Jason Bay to a four-year, $66 million deal. Both Bay and Rodriguez were also huge disappointments in 2010.

 

I think it’s fun to compare the strategies of the Mets and the Twins, whom I find to be the second best-managed team in the 2000s (the best was the Oakland A’s, but I think that team has been covered enough). During the last decade, the Twins averaged $32 million more in playing value than they doled out in player salaries, while the Mets paid out an average of $25 million more than they received in playing value.

 

Before the 2008 season, the Mets acquired via trade and then signed former Twins star Johan Santanta when his performance was at its peak. Though he has been quite good for the Mets, the Twins had no problem winning and avoided paying the ace starter almost $23 million/year for six years. In the three seasons since, the Twins have made the playoffs twice, and the Mets have missed the post-season every year. How did the Twins do it?

 

The key to success lies in acquiring young talent when the collective bargaining rules allow teams to pay players far less than their market value. For their first six years of big-league service, the salaries that players receive are restricted by MLB’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Twins exploited these rules by developing talent within their organization, while the Mets concentrated on bringing already-developed talent in. Comparing their 2010 rosters, the Twins drafted 21 of their players, which is equal to the number of players the Mets had signed as free agents. By building a strong farm system, the Twins have been able to survive with young and cheap talent.

 

The Mets’ market size ought to give them an advantage that allows them to sign better players, but the spending strategy the club has adopted clearly hasn’t worked. If the Mets had adopted the Twins’ method of operation — spending far less for players than they receive in playing value — they might be the most valuable franchise in sports.

 

I thought this was interesting, although pretty basic analysis. Coming into 2011, we'll have Morel, Viciedo (maybe), Beckham, Ramirez, Buehrle, Sale, maybe a reliever like Infante...so maybe just 5 players we drafted ourselves and then Viciedo/Ramirez.

 

nytimes.com (freakonomics)

[mmmmmbeeer]

I hate the idea of evaluating the value of a manager by player statistics. It should be a much more granular study involving specific managerial decisions (pitching changes, walking with an open base, sac bunts, etc.) and how those decisions impacted the outcome of each game.

[Paint it Black]

None of this is ground breaking stuff, nor is it really outside the box, but whatever. Comparing rosters and saying which guys are "homegrown" is kind of stupid. I mean for years the Red Sox have had great young talent and trade that talent for established major league talent. Yeah, it cost them Hanley Ramirez, but it also was a big reason why the won a championship.

 

Nor is it surprising to anyone that Perez, KRod, Castillo, and Bay were all awful contracts when the Mets signed those players. But I would strongly disagree that the Mets were not ready to contend. I mean I didn't think they would, but the way they were built, they were in that "win now" window.

[joeynach]

I thought this was interesting, although pretty basic analysis. Coming into 2011, we'll have Morel, Viciedo (maybe), Beckham, Ramirez, Buehrle, Sale, maybe a reliever like Infante...so maybe just 5 players we drafted ourselves and then Viciedo/Ramirez.

 

nytimes.com (freakonomics)

 

I consider trading for young players before they become establish to be the same as drafting them. Like Paul Konerko, I consider him to be home grown, even though we didnt draft him. We traded for him in like 1999 when he was a virtually unknown. A guy like AJ for example I consider a strict FA acquisition.

[ptatc]

I hate the idea of evaluating the value of a manager by player statistics. It should be a much more granular study involving specific managerial decisions (pitching changes, walking with an open base, sac bunts, etc.) and how those decisions impacted the outcome of each game.

 

the problem with thisis that you negate any impact of actually coaching a player or player motivation. Coaches can teach and help improve player performance. This was his purpose in saying he looked at a players performance from the current team and other teams for which he played.

However, I do agree that should be some input from specific moves in a game and different lineups etc. I think these things are important but in a sport like baseball it's more the mental approach and comfort level where the manager has more of an impact. More often than not the in game strategies are a crapshoot where no one philosophy works all of the time.

[joeynach]

the problem with thisis that you negate any impact of actually coaching a player or player motivation. Coaches can teach and help improve player performance. This was his purpose in saying he looked at a players performance from the current team and other teams for which he played.

However, I do agree that should be some input from specific moves in a game and different lineups etc. I think these things are important but in a sport like baseball it's more the mental approach and comfort level where the manager has more of an impact. More often than not the in game strategies are a crapshoot where no one philosophy works all of the time.

 

I believe this managerial impact is taken into account in Bill James Saber model. In the Bill James Handbook there is a whole section on managers where it breaks down number of times a manger calls for a sacrifice, hit and run, steal, pitching change, etc and then statistically shows his success rate. Most importantly, there is a figure called Manager Wins, which is like WAR for manager, or how many wins is the manager worth given his decision making, strategy, and tactics. I do think that's a very telling figure.

[caulfield12]

Where does Ozzie rank with that Bill James model?

 

I think with Pythagorean (which is another very questionable and simplistic model) he and Gardenhire are almost the same...at least until the last couple of seasons.

 

I would imagine a lot of Sox fans would rather have Gardenhire, and at least 50% of Twins' fans think Gardy isn't the guy "to get to the next level" but that's he is a very good manager, overall.

[Balta1701]

Caufield, I know you included the phrase "NYTimes/Freakonomics" at the end, but if you're going to excerpt that long of a string of text could you please provide an actual hyperlink? Thanks.

[caulfield12]

http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2010...ball&st=cse

 

I tried to download part of the "case study" that's linked here, but my ADOBE/PDF has a bug....maybe someone else can post anything germane to Ozzie from that article?

Edited December 22, 2010 by caulfield12

[ptatc]

I believe this managerial impact is taken into account in Bill James Saber model. In the Bill James Handbook there is a whole section on managers where it breaks down number of times a manger calls for a sacrifice, hit and run, steal, pitching change, etc and then statistically shows his success rate. Most importantly, there is a figure called Manager Wins, which is like WAR for manager, or how many wins is the manager worth given his decision making, strategy, and tactics. I do think that's a very telling figure.

 

I agree with the premise of Bill James' model. I still have a problem with the WAR concept. While it basically attempts to establish an "average" to use as a replacement, it discounts the availability or opportunity of this replacement player. In managers it's even more difficult. Many managers make decisions based on situations and don't always follow the same pattern for strategy. This is problematic enough without looking at the abstract concept of the managers impat on the motivation, mood or focus of a player on a day to day basis.

I like what Bill James and sabermetrics try to do as a whole, I was a subscriber to his early newsletters in the 80's. However, as I've said before from a statisticians point of views he basically decides what he thinks is important and creates a formula in an attempt to quantify it. It has many hole in it and while it is helpful on making decisions people carry way too far.

 

Being heavily involved in reviewing research articles for peer reviewed publications, sometimes you can microanalyze the numbers, make them say what you want them to say and lose sight of the big picture.

 

[ScottyDo]

I agree with the premise of Bill James' model. I still have a problem with the WAR concept. While it basically attempts to establish an "average" to use as a replacement, it discounts the availability or opportunity of this replacement player. In managers it's even more difficult. Many managers make decisions based on situations and don't always follow the same pattern for strategy. This is problematic enough without looking at the abstract concept of the managers impat on the motivation, mood or focus of a player on a day to day basis.

I like what Bill James and sabermetrics try to do as a whole, I was a subscriber to his early newsletters in the 80's. However, as I've said before from a statisticians point of views he basically decides what he thinks is important and creates a formula in an attempt to quantify it. It has many hole in it and while it is helpful on making decisions people carry way too far.

 

Being heavily involved in reviewing research articles for peer reviewed publications, sometimes you can microanalyze the numbers, make them say what you want them to say and lose sight of the big picture.

+1. Except for the whole subscribing in the early 80's thing.

[kitekrazy]

I would imagine a lot of Sox fans would rather have Gardenhire, and at least 50% of Twins' fans think Gardy isn't the guy "to get to the next level" but that's he is a very good manager, overall.

 

Not me. I still think managers get way too much credit good or bad. Then again there are some managers who always win where ever they go.

Funny, looking back at the Santana deal. Many Twin fans were mentioning how they don't have an ace. Well, they got rid of one. They also seem to do well in getting rid of players when their value is the highest. Most players don't excel at a higher level when they leave the organization.

 

[knightni]

Not me. I still think managers get way too much credit good or bad. Then again there are some managers who always win where ever they go.

Funny, looking back at the Santana deal. Many Twin fans were mentioning how they don't have an ace. Well, they got rid of one. They also seem to do well in getting rid of players when their value is the highest. Most players don't excel at a higher level when they leave the organization.

I expect Morneau to be traded in a few years if he rebounds from the concussions.

[southsider2k5]

Not me. I still think managers get way too much credit good or bad. Then again there are some managers who always win where ever they go.

Funny, looking back at the Santana deal. Many Twin fans were mentioning how they don't have an ace. Well, they got rid of one. They also seem to do well in getting rid of players when their value is the highest. Most players don't excel at a higher level when they leave the organization.

 

Sounds like the Sox honestly.

[Balta1701]

I expect Morneau to be traded in a few years if he rebounds from the concussions.

Morneau is signed through the end of the 2013 season, at which point he'll be 32 going on 33.