Interesting insight from Harvard philosophy prof on Moneyball

[caulfield12]

Beane’s strategy succeeded, at least for a time. In 2002, when Lewis followed the team, the Athletics won the western division of the American League. Although they were defeated in the playoffs, the A’s story was an appealing David and Goliath tale: an underfinanced, underdog team uses its wits and the tools of modern econometrics to compete with rich, powerhouse teams like the Yankees. It was also, in Lewis’s telling, an object lesson in how exploiting market inefficiencies can pay off for shrewd investors. Billy Beane brought to baseball what the new breed of quantitative traders brought to Wall Street—an ability to use computer-driven analysis to gain an edge over old-timers who relied on gut instinct and personal experience.³²

 

In 2011, Moneyball was made into a Hollywood movie, with Brad Pitt playing the role of Billy Beane. The movie left me cold. At first, I wasn’t sure why. Brad Pitt was charming and charismatic as always. So why was the movie so unsatisfying? Partly because it ignored the stars of the team—three excellent young starting pitchers and All-Star shortstop Miguel Tejada—and focused instead on marginal players who had been signed by Beane for their ability to draw walks. But the real reason, I think, is that it’s hard to stand up and cheer for the triumph of quantitative methods and more efficient pricing mechanisms. These, more than the players, were the heroes of Moneyball.³³

 

Actually, I do know at least one person who finds price efficiencies inspiring—my friend and colleague Larry Summers (the economist whose morning prayer about economizing altruism I discussed earlier). In a talk he gave in 2004 while president of Harvard, Summers cited Moneyball as illustrative of an “important intellectual revolution that has taken place in the last 30 or 40 years”: the rise of social science, and especially economics, “as an actual form of science.” He explained how “a very wise baseball general manager hired a Ph.D. in econometrics” to figure out what baseball skills and strategies made for a winning team. Summers glimpsed in Beane’s success a larger truth: the moneyball approach to baseball held lessons for the rest of life. “What’s true of baseball is actually true of a much wider range of human activity.”

 

Where else, in Summers’s view, was the wisdom of the scientific, moneyball approach coming to prevail? In the field of environmental regulation, where “committed activists and attorneys” were giving way to “people who were skilled in performing cost-benefit analyses.” In presidential campaigns, where the bright young lawyers who predominated in the past were now less needed than “bright economists and bright MBAs.” And on Wall Street, where computer-savvy, quantitative whizzes were displacing schmoozers and inventing complex new derivatives: “In the last 30 years,” Summers observed, “the field of investment banking has been transformed from a field that was dominated by people who were good at meeting clients at the 19th hole, to people who were good at solving very difficult mathematical problems that were involved in pricing derivative securities.”³⁴

 

Here, just four years before the financial crisis, was the market triumphalist faith—the moneyball faith—on bold display.

 

As events would show, it didn’t turn out well—not for the economy and not for the Oakland Athletics. The A’s last made the playoffs in 2006 and haven’t had a winning season since. To be fair, this is not because moneyball failed but because it spread. Thanks in part to Lewis’s book, other teams, including those with more money, learned the value of signing players with a high on-base percentage. By 2004, such players were no longer a bargain, as rich teams bid up their salaries. The salaries of players who were patient at the plate and drew a lot of walks now reflected their contribution to winning games. The market inefficiencies that Beane had exploited ceased to exist.³⁵

 

Moneyball, it turned out, was not a strategy for underdogs, at least not in the long run. Rich teams could hire statisticians too and outbid poor teams for the ballplayers they recommended. The Boston Red Sox, with one of baseball’s biggest payrolls, won World Series championships in 2004 and 2007, under an owner and a general manager who were moneyball apostles.

 

 

In the years after Lewis’s book appeared, money came to matter more, not less, in determining the winning percentage of major league teams.³⁶

 

This is not at odds with what economic theory predicts. If baseball talent is priced efficiently, the teams with the most money to spend on player salaries can be expected to do best. But this begs a bigger question. Moneyball made baseball more efficient, in the economist’s sense of the term. But did it make it better? Probably not.

 

Consider the changes moneyball has wrought in the way the game is played: more protracted at bats, more walks, more pitches thrown, more pitching changes, less free swinging, less daring on the base paths, fewer bunts and stolen bases. It’s hard to say this counts as an improvement. A drawn-out at bat with the bases loaded and a tie game in the bottom of the ninth can be a classic baseball moment. But a game littered with long at bats and lots of walks is usually a tedious affair. Moneyball hasn’t ruined baseball, but—like other market intrusions of recent years—it’s left the game diminished.

 

This illustrates a point I’ve tried to make about various goods and activities throughout this book: making markets more efficient is no virtue in itself. The real question is whether introducing this or that market mechanism will improve or impair the good of the game. It’s a question worth asking not only of baseball but also of the societies in which we live.

 

from What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limit of Markets

by Michael Sandel

 

It's an interesting argument that I'd never considered. Moneyball is essentially about exploiting a "market niche" to ones advantage before the other teams discover and adjust, not unlike the Royals last year utilizing the theory that developing a young, dominant, cost-controlled bullpen can be a much better way to get back to at least mediocrity than investing it in veteran starting pitchers and free agent acquisitions (of course, acquiring Erwin Santana flies in the face of this).

 

Of course, it has only led to one post-season series win, unless you want to consider the Twins (through their teaching of fundamental baseball, teamwork and letting the other team beat itself) or Rays (investing in farm system, particularly young pitching, as well as outscouting the big-spending franchises) more recent proponents of the system. The article cites Epstein's Red Sox FO, and that's also spot on...although it's a bit counterintuitive in the sense they were spending more than every team out there but the Yankees, definitely in 2007.

 

An even bigger question, with everyone using SABR stats now to define players, have we gotten too far away from traditional metrices like RBI's or batting average? Or has SABR simply enhanced the way we understand the game of basball and provided more objective and "fairer" meansuring tools?

 

 

 

 

 

[witesoxfan]

First and foremost, I strongly disagree that the game has gotten worse or diminished. I treasure the game more than ever because players are prejudiced much less based on body build and more by actual baseball skill.

 

Second, the idea of building a team with an incredibly deep and strong bullpen has been around for a while. Specialization has changed it a little, but having a great bullpen to get to the end of games - yeah, 2002 Angels nailed that.

 

Even with teams trading for prospects, Beane realizes that there is still value in trading players with service time. That's the market inefficiency he is taking advantage of now. Rather than hold players through their arbitration eligible years, deal them the year after they become eligible - you save money and you get better prospects. Yes, you take PR hits for dealing star players, but you continually restock your system and the number of options you have to fill out your roster continually expands and grows more talented, thus allowing you to add a rental piece here or there when/if necessary without any great cost. Tampa Bay does this flawlessly too, and, all things considered, they are probably the premier organization in all of baseball right now.

 

The Royals haven't made the playoffs in like 27 years and they've only had like 2 or 3 winning seasons since that time, and it's because they are run so poorly. The trade for James Shields and Wade Davis this year is a perfect example of that. They gave up 4 very good prospects - one of whom is a top 5 prospect in the entire game, and arguably the best - for a very good starting pitcher and a mediocre starter or good reliever. They still aren't likely to win the division, nor will they be likely to next year, and suddenly that "best farm system in the history of the game" is all for naught.

 

This is something I hope Hahn is able to do a little better than Williams. It's a more conservative path and requires a deeper and better minor league system. However, you can also restock the minor league system faster as well. Hopefully the Sox can continue stockpiling minor league power arms, and maybe in the near future they can deal Nate Jones and'/or Addison Reed. Honestly, there aren't a lot of pieces the Sox can deal right now, but in the next 3-5 years there could be. Stay patient and conservative and only make deals that make sense. Overpaying for players is working right into the hands of guys like Beane and Friedman and they will continue to make those deals 100% of the time, so you better be sure that, if you are overpaying for someone, it's not to compete for a division title but instead to win a goddamn World Series. If you overpay, that division better be gift-wrapped, ready for delivery.

Edited March 20, 2013 by witesoxfan

[caulfield12]

First and foremost, I strongly disagree that the game has gotten worse or diminished. I treasure the game more than ever because players are prejudiced much less based on body build and more by actual baseball skill.

 

Second, the idea of building a team with an incredibly deep and strong bullpen has been around for a while. Specialization has changed it a little, but having a great bullpen to get to the end of games - yeah, 2002 Angels nailed that.

 

Even with teams trading for prospects, Beane realizes that there is still value in trading players with service time. That's the market inefficiency he is taking advantage of now. Rather than hold players through their arbitration eligible years, deal them the year after they become eligible - you save money and you get better prospects. Yes, you take PR hits for dealing star players, but you continually restock your system and the number of options you have to fill out your roster continually expands and grows more talented, thus allowing you to add a rental piece here or there when/if necessary without any great cost. Tampa Bay does this flawlessly too, and, all things considered, they are probably the premier organization in all of baseball right now.

 

The Royals haven't made the playoffs in like 27 years and they've only had like 2 or 3 winning seasons since that time, and it's because they are run so poorly. The trade for James Shields and Wade Davis this year is a perfect example of that. They gave up 4 very good prospects - one of whom is a top 5 prospect in the entire game, and arguably the best - for a very good starting pitcher and a mediocre starter or good reliever. They still aren't likely to win the division, nor will they be likely to next year, and suddenly that "best farm system in the history of the game" is all for naught.

 

This is something I hope Hahn is able to do a little better than Williams. It's a more conservative path and requires a deeper and better minor league system. However, you can also restock the minor league system faster as well. Hopefully the Sox can continue stockpiling minor league power arms, and maybe in the near future they can deal Nate Jones and'/or Addison Reed. Honestly, there aren't a lot of pieces the Sox can deal right now, but in the next 3-5 years there could be. Stay patient and conservative and only make deals that make sense. Overpaying for players is working right into the hands of guys like Beane and Friedman and they will continue to make those deals 100% of the time, so you better be sure that, if you are overpaying for someone, it's not to compete for a division title but instead to win a goddamn World Series. If you overpay, that division better be gift-wrapped, ready for delivery.

 

 

I still believe Santana was the biggest mistake, but maybe the change of scenery will help him. Still, from watching him last year, either his stuff is diminished, he's been overused by the Angels and/or he was injured last year. But, yeah, they're more than a James Shield away from competing with the Tigers. Myers easily could have taken RF from Francouer, who they foolishly signed to a multi-year deal, and who then ended up blocking Myers because of his contract. And, in the end, they will probably end up dealing Alex Gordon when he gets too expensive, so they'll repeat the same process of having to deal position players to shore up their starting pitching inadequacies.

 

As far as the A's go, the Gio Gonzalez move to the Nationals is a pretty good example to illustrate your point....as well as that other Moneyball-ish idea of dumping closers when they become overpaid or start to lose some of their stuff, like Koch. They went through a five year period where they had a different closer every year.

 

This also is an area where the White Sox haven't invested a lot of money until Jenks got more expensive. They've had Howry, Foulke, Gordon, Marte, Takatsu, Hermanson, Addison Reed, etc.

 

In fact, you can argue they invested MORE money into the likes of set-up guys like Dotel, Linebrink, Thornton, Crain, etc.

 

As far as the last point about overpaying, the Jackson/Hudson and Swisher moves definitely smack of that...or overpaying for the aforementioned veteran relievers, which they've addressed now in the last couple of years with their minor league system as well as cherry-picking some plus arms from other organizations and nurturing them along.

 

 

Edited March 20, 2013 by caulfield12

[ptatc]

First and foremost, I strongly disagree that the game has gotten worse or diminished. I treasure the game more than ever because players are prejudiced much less based on body build and more by actual baseball skill.

 

Second, the idea of building a team with an incredibly deep and strong bullpen has been around for a while. Specialization has changed it a little, but having a great bullpen to get to the end of games - yeah, 2002 Angels nailed that.

 

Even with teams trading for prospects, Beane realizes that there is still value in trading players with service time. That's the market inefficiency he is taking advantage of now. Rather than hold players through their arbitration eligible years, deal them the year after they become eligible - you save money and you get better prospects. Yes, you take PR hits for dealing star players, but you continually restock your system and the number of options you have to fill out your roster continually expands and grows more talented, thus allowing you to add a rental piece here or there when/if necessary without any great cost. Tampa Bay does this flawlessly too, and, all things considered, they are probably the premier organization in all of baseball right now.

 

The Royals haven't made the playoffs in like 27 years and they've only had like 2 or 3 winning seasons since that time, and it's because they are run so poorly. The trade for James Shields and Wade Davis this year is a perfect example of that. They gave up 4 very good prospects - one of whom is a top 5 prospect in the entire game, and arguably the best - for a very good starting pitcher and a mediocre starter or good reliever. They still aren't likely to win the division, nor will they be likely to next year, and suddenly that "best farm system in the history of the game" is all for naught.

 

This is something I hope Hahn is able to do a little better than Williams. It's a more conservative path and requires a deeper and better minor league system. However, you can also restock the minor league system faster as well. Hopefully the Sox can continue stockpiling minor league power arms, and maybe in the near future they can deal Nate Jones and'/or Addison Reed. Honestly, there aren't a lot of pieces the Sox can deal right now, but in the next 3-5 years there could be. Stay patient and conservative and only make deals that make sense. Overpaying for players is working right into the hands of guys like Beane and Friedman and they will continue to make those deals 100% of the time, so you better be sure that, if you are overpaying for someone, it's not to compete for a division title but instead to win a goddamn World Series. If you overpay, that division better be gift-wrapped, ready for delivery.

I disagree. I think with the front offices and agents relying more on stats makes the players more worried about the numbers than the game sometimes even the win. Pitchers come out earlier to preserve their stats. Hitters no loner hit to the right side to move the runners because it will diminish their stats, even though it can help scoring.

It's obviously not all hitters or pitchers but I think this idea is prevalent. Of course as players the money is a factor. They will fall in line to get the bigger contract if that is what everyone is looking for.

[caulfield12]

I disagree. I think with the front offices and agents relying more on stats makes the players more worried about the numbers than the game sometimes even the win. Pitchers come out earlier to preserve their stats. Hitters no loner hit to the right side to move the runners because it will diminish their stats, even though it can help scoring.

It's obviously not all hitters or pitchers but I think this idea is prevalent. Of course as players the money is a factor. They will fall in line to get the bigger contract if that is what everyone is looking for.

 

 

There's also a cultural correlation, where someone like Viciedo or Alexei got noticed for their flair and hitting skills, but not necessarily doing the little things well. Alexei to this day doesn't have enough patience and pull hooks 90% of the balls he hits on the infield instead of adjusting for the situation.

 

The famous saying with Dominican players is "you don't WALK your way off the island, you hit your way," and it's pretty rare even in their major league careers that you see players from the Dominican or Puerto Rico with huge OBP numbers. Vlad Guerrero would be a prime example.

 

If they want to go back to a successful, fundamentals-based approach, and get away from "chicks dig the longball" 2000-2004 White Sox baseball, then the countries to emulate are definitely Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei. Those players tend to be smaller and not home run hitters, so to continue to have success in their professional leagues, they have to sacrifice themselves depending on the situation.

 

Of course, there has to be a balance. The "Twins' Way" thing only goes so far when you run into superior competition.

 

Another factor is all those SABR and statistical analyses proving that sacrificing batters or stealing bases don't lead to as many runs scored as the Earl Weaver approach to baseball.

[ptatc]

There's also a cultural correlation, where someone like Viciedo or Alexei got noticed for their flair and hitting skills, but not necessarily doing the little things well. Alexei to this day doesn't have enough patience and pull hooks 90% of the balls he hits on the infield instead of adjusting for the situation.

 

The famous saying with Dominican players is "you don't WALK your way off the island, you hit your way," and it's pretty rare even in their major league careers that you see players from the Dominican or Puerto Rico with huge OBP numbers. Vlad Guerrero would be a prime example.

 

If they want to go back to a successful, fundamentals-based approach, and get away from "chicks dig the longball" 2000-2004 White Sox baseball, then the countries to emulate are definitely Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei. Those players tend to be smaller and not home run hitters, so to continue to have success in their professional leagues, they have to sacrifice themselves depending on the situation.

 

Of course, there has to be a balance. The "Twins' Way" thing only goes so far when you run into superior competition.

 

Another factor is all those SABR and statistical analyses proving that sacrificing batters or stealing bases don't lead to as many runs scored as the Earl Weaver approach to baseball.

I don't disagree with all of what you said. I like the "small ball" way as opposed to the home run driven teams. The homerun driven teams will slowly fall away with PED testing.

Part of the problem is that people assume hitting to the right side means sacrificing. That isn't the case. You hit to the right side and have a chance to get a hit because the first baseman is holding the runner on. That is different than sacrifing with a bunt. The increased focus on stats keeps players focused on them instead of on the big picture. That was one of the thingsd that teammates had a problem with regarding Frank Thomas, Always going for the batting line in the paper instead of worrying about the only thing that should matter, winning.

[caulfield12]

I don't disagree with all of what you said. I like the "small ball" way as opposed to the home run driven teams. The homerun driven teams will slowly fall away with PED testing.

Part of the problem is that people assume hitting to the right side means sacrificing. That isn't the case. You hit to the right side and have a chance to get a hit because the first baseman is holding the runner on. That is different than sacrifing with a bunt. The increased focus on stats keeps players focused on them instead of on the big picture. That was one of the thingsd that teammates had a problem with regarding Frank Thomas, Always going for the batting line in the paper instead of worrying about the only thing that should matter, winning.

 

Yeah, it goes back to the way Pods and Iguchi played the game the first half of 2005 together.

 

You take advantage of the holes in the defense, situationally.

 

How many times have we seen Sox hitters pull balls to 3B and SS in those situations for tailor-made double plays? (Yes, Alexei or Alex Rios in the past or any number of Sox offenders).

 

That's not to say they've never hit the ball to the opposite side and unintentionally grounded into a DP, but the odds of getting a hit are much higher going that direction than pulling the ball, because you have the 1B covering the bag and the 2B in movement with the possibility of a steal, opening up 85% of the right side depending on the situation.

 

But yeah, sacrificing yourself in that way is totally different than bunting a runner over to put him in scoring position.

 

 

 

And I don't remember as many complaints about Harold Baines (when he was the best hitter on the team for nearly a decade) making similar "selfish" outs, compared to the criticism that Thomas received as a purported "stats first, team second" player.

Edited March 21, 2013 by caulfield12

[ptatc]

Yeah, it goes back to the way Pods and Iguchi played the game the first half of 2005 together.

 

You take advantage of the holes in the defense, situationally.

 

How many times have we seen Sox hitters pull balls to 3B and SS in those situations for tailor-made double plays? (Yes, Alexei or Alex Rios in the past or any number of Sox offenders).

 

That's not to say they've never hit the ball to the opposite side and unintentionally grounded into a DP, but the odds of getting a hit are much higher going that direction than pulling the ball, because you have the 1B covering the bag and the 2B in movement with the possibility of a steal, opening up 85% of the right side depending on the situation.

 

But yeah, sacrificing yourself in that way is totally different than bunting a runner over to put him in scoring position.

 

 

 

And I don't remember as many complaints about Harold Baines (when he was the best hitter on the team for nearly a decade) making similar "selfish" outs, compared to the criticism that Thomas received as a purported "stats first, team second" player.

You don't remember them about Harold because he didn't talk to anyone. Harold was the cliche of the same player whether he had a good day or bad day. That's my point with Thomas. He is the best right handed hitter I've seen but it was more the way he was so obvious with complaining about stats and errors that should be turned into hits. He always focused on those thing after games. There were games the Sox won and he was miserable and angry because a hit was taken away.

 

Some of the reason that players don't hit the other way is that is decreases power which in turn decreases OPS which is the current "best way" to determine the overall quality of a hitter.

[caulfield12]

You don't remember them about Harold because he didn't talk to anyone. Harold was the cliche of the same player whether he had a good day or bad day. That's my point with Thomas. He is the best right handed hitter I've seen but it was more the way he was so obvious with complaining about stats and errors that should be turned into hits. He always focused on those thing after games. There were games the Sox won and he was miserable and angry because a hit was taken away.

 

Some of the reason that players don't hit the other way is that is decreases power which in turn decreases OPS which is the current "best way" to determine the overall quality of a hitter.

 

With the exceptions of Viciedo and Carlos Quentin, I'll agree with you.

 

That opposite field doubles stroke was also what made Beckham so dangerous in the beginning, but then he got away from it...perhaps the allure of the big power numbers at USCF was too alluring. Ironically, he's had seasons when he was MUCH better hitting on the road than at home.

 

 

Edited March 21, 2013 by caulfield12

[caulfield12]

http://www.tampabay.com/sports/baseball/ra...d-pasts/2110921

 

Another form of Moneyball, played by the Rays.

 

The White Sox have been right out there over the last decade, taking numerous similar chances of their own.

 

Of course, it didn't work so well with Swisher, O-Cab or Javy, for it usually has. There have been notable misses, like Albert Belle or David Wells, though.

[3GamesToLove]

http://www.tampabay.com/sports/baseball/ra...d-pasts/2110921

 

Another form of Moneyball, played by the Rays.

 

The White Sox have been right out there over the last decade, taking numerous similar chances of their own.

 

Of course, it didn't work so well with Swisher, O-Cab or Javy, for it usually has. There have been notable misses, like Albert Belle or David Wells, though.

 

Which reminds me--anyone read Jonah Keri's The Extra 2%? It focuses on how the Rays ownership and front office rescued the franchise from obscurity. It's a quick read--not quite as readable as Moneyball as it gets very into Wall Street and financial strategies...but I enjoyed it because I remember the '08 Rays a lot better than I remember the '02 Athletics.

[southsider2k5]

http://www.tampabay.com/sports/baseball/ra...d-pasts/2110921

 

Another form of Moneyball, played by the Rays.

 

The White Sox have been right out there over the last decade, taking numerous similar chances of their own.

 

Of course, it didn't work so well with Swisher, O-Cab or Javy, for it usually has. There have been notable misses, like Albert Belle or David Wells, though.

 

Belle wouldn't classify as a miss. They got his best season, and then he left just in time to get hurt and be done.

[iamshack]

When you've got fewer resources to expend, you've got to use them more wisely than those who have more resources than you. Eventually, and we may be reaching this point soon, the pendulum swings too far in the other direction, and the market overvalues certain skills, in this case, OBP. Then you need to sign the guys that have other skills but lack the one the market is overvaluing, and there is your market inefficiency. The troubled player is the same thing. Once the market realized it is overvaluing a skill, you'll see the pendulum start swinging back again, and you won't have as many guys taking the protracted at bats because they will have been replaced by some guys with a more all-around game.

 

In any market you're going to have some smart folks seeing certain things ahead of the rest and taking advantage of that. Then the market reacts, overreacts, then slowly corrects itself again.

 

We just need Hahn to be one of the smart folks.

[caulfield12]

Which reminds me--anyone read Jonah Keri's The Extra 2%?

 

some of the more negative amazon reviews

 

This review is from: The Extra 2%: How Wall Street Strategies Took a Major League Baseball Team from Worst to First (Hardcover)

Unfortunately, I cannot recommend this book for avid baseball fans. There were times that I had to put to book down in frustration because it felt like I was reading a marketing piece on the Rays front office written by their PR department. I was excited to read this book after viewing excerpts on Deadspin and hearing an interview with the author on ESPN's Baseball Today Podcast. However, there's' really nothing of substance in this book besides anecdotal stories that put the new ownership group on a pedestal while shoveling dirt on the former regime. Admittedly, I'm not from Tampa so I don't know how bad the community felt towards to Naimoli reign. However, if the book's purpose was to demonstrate how the Rays organization has been able to field competitive teams despite playing in the American League East against teams with revenue streams in multiples of the Rays, I don't see the point in painstakingly detailing how horrible Naimoli was an owner throughout the entire book. Furthermore, it felt like the author was contractually obligated to reference Wall Street within one sentence of mentioning the Sternberg/Silverman/Friedman management team.

 

Before I get crucified for this, I appreciate the youth movement that is going on in MLB front offices. I strongly believe in analytical data over intangibles. However, the author seems to imply that only a handful of teams are employing these techniques which is simply inaccurate. Unquestionably, organizations like the Rays have a much smaller margin of error than other teams within MLB and have embraced a more technical, analytical approach to player evaluation. However, the author's suggestion that the Rays recent on-field success is primarily due to the genius of Sternberg, Silverman and Friedman while marginalizing the work of the scouting department and others within the organization was frustrating.

 

 

 

This review is from: The Extra 2%: How Wall Street Strategies Took a Major League Baseball Team from Worst to First (Hardcover)

I bought this book expecting to learn the business principles behind how the Rays went from worst to first. I felt like over half of the book was just a tangent on how the old mangement staff managed the Rays. I guess if you are a Rays fan it may be interesting, but otherwise all that info could have been presented in one chapter. I felt like the author revealed very little about how the new management used wall street strategies to improve the team. There's a few bits here and there but all that is clouded by the author's dedication to the old management and other general baseball facts. Does there really need to be a whole chapter on the fact that there is a mismatch between the funds of teams like the Rays and teams like the Red Sox and Yankees?

 

 

 

This review is from: The Extra 2%: How Wall Street Strategies Took a Major League Baseball Team from Worst to First (Hardcover)

This was an article posing as a book. There was a lot of repetition--how many different ways can you say that the Yankees and Red Sox, who play in the same divisions as the Rays, have way more resources? The author found dozens. If you are simply interested in how the Rays managed to succeed for 2 seasons after a decade of futility, this book will tell you. But the title of the book suggested that there was some especially interesting angle that accounted for the success. But that was a front. The new owners were from Wall Street, and they used careful evaluation and planning. But that's about it. They preferred stats over intuition, but that story has already been told in "Moneyball". On p. 218 the author summarizes: "Through meticulous planning, skillful player development, uncanny patience,and, yes, some high draft picks and shared revenue, the Rays threw off their last place shackles and gunned down the two toughest behemouths of the sport." That's about it. If you care about the Rays (or the underdog) the book might have a special interest, but not otherwise. The author suggests that the Rays attended to newfangled stats relating to defense, that took them beyond the A's attention to on-base percentage, but that was never really shown. I marked lots of spots where the claims of some special approach melted under scrutiny, but they don't seem worth relating. Perhaps the one howler worth mentioning (200-201) was how important it was that during spring training of 2009 the Rays did baserunning drills designed to improve aggressiveness but decrease mistakes on the basepaths, but that it panned out in stats only in 2010 (2009 stats being hardly affected). Isn't that known as the "post hoc ergo propter hoc" fallacy?

 

[Disco72]

Which reminds me--anyone read Jonah Keri's The Extra 2%? It focuses on how the Rays ownership and front office rescued the franchise from obscurity. It's a quick read--not quite as readable as Moneyball as it gets very into Wall Street and financial strategies...but I enjoyed it because I remember the '08 Rays a lot better than I remember the '02 Athletics.

 

 

some of the more negative amazon reviews

 

If you want the baseball part of the story, it does ok. The "extra 2%" and "Wall Street" stuff is a forced narrative that never pays off.

[caulfield12]

Belle wouldn't classify as a miss. They got his best season, and then he left just in time to get hurt and be done.

 

 

Yes, but a lot of those stats were put up after the Sox were far behind in the standings.

 

 

Most importantly, he never really fit in with his teammates, wasn't cooperative with the front office and nor was he ever embraced by the fans.