Iranian Nuclear Deal

[Balta1701]

So since I last looked the Iraq war was described as "less than ideal" and we got an argument for why the war with Iran has already started. Yup, that's about what I expected.

 

That's a helluva "those who do not learn from history" post right there.

[L. Ron Paultard]

So since I last looked the Iraq war was described as "less than ideal" and we got an argument for why the war with Iran has already started. Yup, that's about what I expected.

 

That's a helluva "those who do not learn from history" post right there.

 

That's nothing if not, ahem, "substance-intensive" there, Balta. Snarky "gotcha!" Twitterism burnnnn ouchie.

 

As I said, this is why politics is such pits at its general best, and the Iran thing? Hail Allah the Mercifully Magnanimous, it's partisan shibboleths and dog-whistles non-stop.

 

And yes, compared to my peers I am only *moderately* liberal.

[StrangeSox]

I've never seen anyone who isn't a right wing conservative bring up alinski

[DrunkBomber]

He types exactly like Dennis Miller talks.

[Balta1701]

That's nothing if not, ahem, "substance-intensive" there, Balta. Snarky "gotcha!" Twitterism burnnnn ouchie.

 

As I said, this is why politics is such pits at its general best, and the Iran thing? Hail Allah the Mercifully Magnanimous, it's partisan shibboleths and dog-whistles non-stop.

 

And yes, compared to my peers I am only *moderately* liberal.

Somehow I question your sincerity.

[L. Ron Paultard]

Somehow I question your sincerity.

 

....which is of course par for the course for 'The Deal'-pologists across the board. Question the very sincerity & impugn the motives of the opponent.

 

In fact the worst the Deal looks on the merits -- and the "hits" just keep on coming with all the hidden side-deals, non-disclosures, time-worn obfuscatory tactics..... the more bizarre the accusations.

 

btw, been on campus much lately?

 

 

 

[L. Ron Paultard]

O ya, 1 last thing about the oft-used Chamberlain parallel. admittedly As bad as that was, at least there are 3 obvious mitigating factors:

 

1) Chamberlain didn't have the full benefit of precedent/hindsight that we do. (Incidentally, neither did the many Isolationist voices inside the US)

2) knowing the war was inevitable, Chamberlain was merely biding for time.

3) the Nuclear dimension.

 

 

So that somehow makes this Vienna debacle even worse. If Ayatollahs frowned on dancing on religious grounds before... well, just paint the Mullahs' heads on my avatar Gif -- 24/7 you know it, playas bwa-hahhaha!

 

Throwing pens and yelling is one thing, Over/under on how many times Zarif must have gotten up in a middle of deliberations, walked over to John Kerry's side and flicked Kerry's nose as hard as he can --- you know just to see what happens.

[southsider2k5]

O ya, 1 last thing about the oft-used Chamberlain parallel. admittedly As bad as that was, at least there are 3 obvious mitigating factors:

 

1) Chamberlain didn't have the full benefit of precedent/hindsight that we do. (Incidentally, neither did the many Isolationist voices inside the US)

2) knowing the war was inevitable, Chamberlain was merely biding for time.

3) the Nuclear dimension.

 

 

So that somehow makes this Vienna debacle even worse. If Ayatollahs frowned on dancing on religious grounds before... well, just paint the Mullahs' heads on my avatar Gif -- 24/7 you know it, playas bwa-hahhaha!

 

Throwing pens and yelling is one thing, Over/under on how many times Zarif must have gotten up in a middle of deliberations, walked over to John Kerry's side and flicked Kerry's nose as hard as he can --- you know just to see what happens.

 

Hi Brando.

[Balta1701]

Last month a group of Senators met with the negotiating representatives of the other major powers in the agreement & heard their positions about what would happen if the US voted down this deal.

British Ambassador Peter Westmacott insisted any chances of getting a better deal were “far-fetched,” according to two individuals in the room. He also speculated that international sanctions against Tehran would fall apart even if Congress blocked the deal — a view seconded by Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.

 

A British Embassy spokesperson declined to discuss the details of a closed meeting, but said London’s position was clear. “If Congress rejects this good deal, and the U.S. is forced to walk away, Iran will be left with an unconstrained nuclear program with far weaker monitoring arrangements, the current international consensus on sanctions would unravel, and international unity and pressure on Iran would be seriously undermined,” said the spokesperson.

[EvilMonkey]

Last month a group of Senators met with the negotiating representatives of the other major powers in the agreement & heard their positions about what would happen if the US voted down this deal.

Of course they would. Follow the money!

 

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6339/ira...uropeans-profit

[Panerista]

Last month a group of Senators met with the negotiating representatives of the other major powers in the agreement & heard their positions about what would happen if the US voted down this deal.

Cue the imperialist Republicans.

[Balta1701]

Of course they would. Follow the money!

 

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6339/ira...uropeans-profit

So you're in agreement that the sanctions will crumble if the U.S. backs out?

[Cknolls]

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a9f4e408039...-nuke-work-site

 

 

 

Well i am aboard now...Rest assured we are in good hands.

[Soxfest]

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a9f4e408039...-nuke-work-site

 

 

 

Well i am aboard now...Rest assured we are in good hands.

This is absurd so basically no supervision at all.............Fox in the hen house mentality.

[Jenksismyhero]

I just read this (good read) yesterday. What timing given that side deal news:

 

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/4226...-foreign-policy

 

 

[EvilMonkey]

Those Tea-party bastards at AP don't like the deal much.

 

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a9f4e408039...-nuke-work-site

 

VIENNA (AP) — Iran will be allowed to use its own inspectors to investigate a site it has been accused of using to develop nuclear arms, operating under a secret agreement with the U.N. agency that normally carries out such work, according to a document seen by The Associated Press

.

.

."International inspections should be done by international inspectors. Period. The standard of 'anywhere, anytime' inspections - so critical to a viable agreement - has dropped to 'when Iran wants, where Iran wants, on Iran's terms,'" said U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce in a reaction typical of opponents of the broader deal.

 

Yeah, an agreement with some TEETH! What difference is there between this and 'letting it crumble' as you say? We should at least be keeping that cash and not returning it. Call it payment for all the inspections we don't get to do.

[GoSox05]

I just read this (good read) yesterday. What timing given that side deal news:

 

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/4226...-foreign-policy

 

This is one of the worst things I have ever read. I had to read it twice, because I thought I missed the punchline the first go around.

 

 

 

[Jake]

I found the expert testimony by MIT nuclear arms expert James Walsh very helpful. It was recommended to me in an article in Tablet Magazine, a publication that targets solely Jewish readers. I don't know if that makes Walsh pro-Jewish interests in particular or anything like that, just that a reasonable person who is skeptical of the deal from the Israeli point of view thought this was a good document.

 

Bear in mind it was given before any deal had been announced. His aim was to provide a framework to evaluate an agreement, giving among other things some insight into what is practical, what is necessary, and what past experience tells us is effective.

 

He introduces the evaluation criteria with this:

In summary, the selection of criteria for an agreement should be informed by Iran's past cheating, the fact that Iran already possesses a basic nuclear capability, the opportunity presented by the absence of an Iranian decision to pursue nuclear weapons, the success of past nonproliferation efforts.

 

Given the objective, what we know about Iran in particular and what we know about the track record of nonproliferation agreements in general, it is possible to outline several criteria that policymakers can use to evaluate a nuclear agreement with Iran.

 

These criteria take the form of both questions and principles.

 

Here are the guidelines provided:

A. Does an agreement substantially advance the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon? He emphasizes that there cannot be an agreement that doesn't involve risk.

 

B. Is the agreement sustainable? He clarifies that this means the agreement has to be reasonably likely to be complied with by all actors. He says you will only achieve this if the agreement produces clear benefits for Iran that will make their domestic politics favor compliance.

 

C. Using simple, broad measures, how does an agreement compare to the status quo? Suggested ways of answering this question is to look at break out time, the number of IAEA inspectors in Iran, and the number of places and activities that are for the first time being investigated.

 

D. Avoid myopically focusing on any single number. He says past agreements have fallen apart because of domestic fights over specific parts of the agreements that are only one part of the overall equation. He believes "Iran's nuclear future is essentially a political question, and so ignoring the political variables and instead focusing on a narrow technical issue is likely to yield a flawed evaluation."

 

E. Adopt a "whole of agreement" approach. Basically the flipside of D. He says to "resist the strong and natural temptation to cherry pick or focus on one aspect of the agreement."

 

F. How does the agreement compare with other successful (and unsuccessful) nuclear agreements? Self-explanatory.

 

G. How does an agreement compare to the other alternative for dealing with Iran's nuclear program? He says those alternatives are doing nothing, imposing new sanctions, use of military force, and walking away from negotiations and hoping Iran will return to the table with more concessions. The principle here is to emphasize not just the hypothetical world with the agreement, but the realistic one without it.

 

H. Assessment should avoid making perfect the enemy of the good. Says there are always people who cannot fathom an agreement that doesn't handle certain things perfectly. Points to fact that previous, highly successful agreements had serious problems and risks. Made a point that no other nuclear agreement has involved any other sorts of issues like human rights, terrorism, etc. Points out potential unintended consequences of far-reaching suggestions such as complete dismantlement leading nuclear scientists to look for work elsewhere, potentially in other hostile nations while complete dismantlement would likely offer no extra benefit for the West.

 

And here are what he calls minimum requirements for an agreement:

 

1. Adherence to what might be called Additional Protocol “Plus,” that is, Iran would implement the requirements of the AP but go beyond the AP in terms of the level of transparency provided for some period of time

2. Adherence to the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its safeguards agreement

3. Changing the design for the Arak reactor

4. No reprocessing

5. Limits on the level of enrichment

6. Limits of the number of centrifuges

7. Limits on the types of centrifuges that operate

8. Limits on the size of the material stockpile

9. Limits on the composition of the material stockpile

10. Iran must resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA, and the agency certifies that it is satisfied with the results of its inquiry.

11. Prompt but reciprocally proportioned sanctions relief

12. A process for the timely investigation of alleged violations

13. Provision for the reintroduction of sanctions following a material breach of the agreement by Iran

 

Here is another nugget, emphases in original.

 

As contemporary scholars of nuclear studies have repeatedly pointed out, the historical record for non-proliferation is a surprising story of success.

 

...

 

The data also suggests that negotiated agreements are a powerful tool for achieving nonproliferation objectives. . . . contrary to my expectations, nonproliferation agreements can have a profound effect. From the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to the Libya nuclear agreement, negotiated agreements are among the most important tools governments have to preventing and reversing proliferation.

 

There's a ton of other good stuff I couldn't include for the sake of (relative) brevity. Pertinent to today's news is that Fisher emphasizes trusting IAEA's expertise, citing their track record along with the USA. He also cautions against the desire to want unfettered access to all potentially interesting sites in the country, something that would be expensive to implement, unlikely to make a meaningful impact, and that no reasonable nation would ever agree to. Says Iran is the most watched country in the world and that it is exceedingly unlikely they could implement a nuclear program without being noticed. Is optimistic since some older agreements were implemented back when nobody with a straight face would even ask to be able to visit a military facility and now we're quibbling over how many and how often.

[Jenksismyhero]

This is one of the worst things I have ever read. I had to read it twice, because I thought I missed the punchline the first go around.

 

Great analysis!

 

It's not really complicated: history shows that when you try to play nice and appease your enemy (or people who are acting in ways you don't like) they never see the appeasing act as some olive branch being extended, they view it as a sign of weakness.

 

You'll note in this example with Iran, of course, that we're trying to play nice with them in an effort to curb their nuclear ambitions and yet the first thing they did was to declare that we're weak and that we should all still die.

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/21/...N0PV1B320150721

 

Now we have reports that the deal would allow Iran to inspect their own facilities and then report their totally neutral, independent findings to the IAEA. I have as much faith of that being a fair and accurate process as I do with the NFL hiring independent experts to talk about deflated footballs.

 

[Jenksismyhero]

Those Tea-party bastards at AP don't like the deal much.

 

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a9f4e408039...-nuke-work-site

 

VIENNA (AP) — Iran will be allowed to use its own inspectors to investigate a site it has been accused of using to develop nuclear arms, operating under a secret agreement with the U.N. agency that normally carries out such work, according to a document seen by The Associated Press

.

.

."International inspections should be done by international inspectors. Period. The standard of 'anywhere, anytime' inspections - so critical to a viable agreement - has dropped to 'when Iran wants, where Iran wants, on Iran's terms,'" said U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce in a reaction typical of opponents of the broader deal.

 

Yeah, an agreement with some TEETH! What difference is there between this and 'letting it crumble' as you say? We should at least be keeping that cash and not returning it. Call it payment for all the inspections we don't get to do.

 

The end result here is basically we just lifted their sanctions. And got nothing for it other than "trust us!"

[GoSox05]

Great analysis!

 

It's not really complicated: history shows that when you try to play nice and appease your enemy (or people who are acting in ways you don't like) they never see the appeasing act as some olive branch being extended, they view it as a sign of weakness.

 

You'll note in this example with Iran, of course, that we're trying to play nice with them in an effort to curb their nuclear ambitions and yet the first thing they did was to declare that we're weak and that we should all still die.

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/21/...N0PV1B320150721

 

Now we have reports that the deal would allow Iran to inspect their own facilities and then report their totally neutral, independent findings to the IAEA. I have as much faith of that being a fair and accurate process as I do with the NFL hiring independent experts to talk about deflated footballs.

 

I just think it's pretty ignorant to say that the situation with Iran is anything like what was going on in post World War 1 Europe or that every conflict with another country well end up like Nazi Germany.

 

Article just uses dumb cliches.

 

[Balta1701]

So, the AP article on this issue is actually surprisingly vague and weak on details. Let me give a few direct example quotes:

Iran will be allowed to use its own inspectors to investigate a site it has been accused of using to develop nuclear arms, operating under a secret agreement with the U.N. agency that normally carries out such work, according to a document seen by The Associated Press.

 

....

 

 

The agreement in question diverges from normal procedures by allowing Tehran to employ its own experts and equipment in the search for evidence of activities it has consistently denied - trying to develop nuclear weapons.

 

Olli Heinonen, who was in charge of the Iran probe as deputy IAEA director general from 2005 to 2010, said he could think of no similar concession with any other country.

 

....

Iran is to provide agency experts with photos and videos of locations the IAEA says are linked to the alleged weapons work, "taking into account military concerns."

 

That wording suggests that - beyond being barred from physically visiting the site - the agency won't get photo or video information from areas Iran says are off-limits because they have military significance.

 

While the document says the IAEA "will ensure the technical authenticity" of Iran's inspection, it does not say how

None of these details appear all that different from procedures the IAEA has previously used during inspection of military facilities in the past. Note for example that the AP version does not state that the IAEA will be barred from the sites, it sets up a procedure for military situations where the IAEA is present and conducts a sampling and monitoring using cleared Iranian personnel. The AP article gives basically no details about the actual details of the inspection other than "photos and videos are required" but they don't say what those photos and videos are needed to document. Based on a bit of reading, my guess is the most likely thing they'd want to document is the sampling process. According to the non-profit Arms Control Association the IAEA has established procedures for obtaining appropriate samples from such sites.

. Under managed access procedures that may be employed the IAEA, the inspected party may take environmental swipe samples at a particular site in the presence of the IAEA inspectors using swabs and containment bags provided by the IAEA to prevent cross contamination. According to former IAEA officials, this is an established procedure.

 

Such swipe samples collected at suspect sites under managed access would likely be divided into six packages: three are taken by the IAEA for analysis at its Seibersdorf Analytical Lab and two to be sent to the IAEA's Network of Analytical Labs (NWAL), which comprises some 16 labs in different countries, and another package to be kept under joint IAEA and Iran seal at the IAEA office in Iran a backup and control sample if re-analysis might be required at a later stage. The process ensures the integrity of the inspection operation and the samples for all parties.

Given appropriately documented samples collected using standardized procedures, the ability of Iran to cover up enrichment work would remain effectively zero.

[Jenksismyhero]

So, the AP article on this issue is actually surprisingly vague and weak on details. Let me give a few direct example quotes:

None of these details appear all that different from procedures the IAEA has previously used during inspection of military facilities in the past. Note for example that the AP version does not state that the IAEA will be barred from the sites, it sets up a procedure for military situations where the IAEA is present and conducts a sampling and monitoring using cleared Iranian personnel. The AP article gives basically no details about the actual details of the inspection other than "photos and videos are required" but they don't say what those photos and videos are needed to document. Based on a bit of reading, my guess is the most likely thing they'd want to document is the sampling process. According to the non-profit Arms Control Association the IAEA has established procedures for obtaining appropriate samples from such sites.

Given appropriately documented samples collected using standardized procedures, the ability of Iran to cover up enrichment work would remain effectively zero.

 

What's the point of being able to select your own inspectors if the IAEA is still going to perform inspections?

[Jenksismyhero]

I just think it's pretty ignorant to say that the situation with Iran is anything like what was going on in post World War 1 Europe or that every conflict with another country well end up like Nazi Germany.

 

Article just uses dumb cliches.

 

So you basically didn't read it. He brings up other examples (immigration and immigration supporters), Castro and his brother, Putin, Libya, etc. His mention of Nazi Germany was pretty short.

 

Give me an example of when Obama "played nice" and the situation has dramatically changed for the better in terms of US interests.

[Balta1701]

What's the point of being able to select your own inspectors if the IAEA is still going to perform inspections?

To keep the IAEA inspectors physically out of rooms used for military weapons development/production. Their job is to verify the absence of enriched nuclear material that violates the limits usable for nuclear weapons production - that's it. Iran has the right to develop conventional weapons and even to mount those things to missiles - if they don't want IAEA inspectors seeing parts of things like their air defense systems, that's an entirely reasonable thing for them in that region.

 

What the IAEA needs most is samples collected appropriately to send through detection equipment. If they get that from these sites, they've got a very important verification tool. The trick is to make sure that there's some monitoring capability that verifies that the samples are appropriately collected from the sites of interest - hence the video and photograph requirements. Measurements taken in the facility to indicate the presence or absence of radioactive material combined with monitoring of those measurements and sampling of sites to verify that the monitoring happened appropriately should be able to do the job.

 

Now of course it's possible there is some additional cover-up in this section, but from the AP's description there's no obvious reason to think that the IAEA would be unable to do their job.